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INTRODUCTION
What good is law that cannot be enforced? International law is often a
target of this question, and thus, enforcement is a topic that has concerned
many scholars of international law. Specifically, the sub-field of interna-
tional law known as international humanitarian law (IHL), or the law of
* Professor Shana Tabak is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgia State
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discussed in my book chapter, Armed Conflict and the Inter-American System of Human
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war, suffers from a lack of enforcement options as its Achilles heel. Al-
though IHL has attempted to limit battlefield brutality for centuries,
scholars and practitioners have long bemoaned the reliance of this law on
party compliance. IHL has aimed to create a semblance of order on the
battlefield, and has sought to protect those individuals not fighting, such as
civilians, detainees, and the sick or wounded. In spite of this well-devel-
oped ideology, humanitarian law lacks binding enforcement mechanisms.
There is no single international adjudicative body specifically charged with
enforcing IHL, and thus interpretation is left to a fragmented variety of
judicial bodies.1 Some recent advances have been identified. For example,
the statutes of numerous international criminal tribunals have adopted
specific principles of IHL.2 Still, no tribunal exists with explicit subject
matter jurisdiction over situations that may give rise to state violations of
international humanitarian law or to find direct violations of IHL in those
situations. This is because, by and large, IHL was created as a body of law
that was intended to be self-regulated by states.3 Thus, contexts in which
there is no clear tribunal to offer remedies of IHL violations may include
the indiscriminate massacre of indigenous villagers in Colombia,4 acts of
military defense that may exceed proportionality limitations in the Gaza
Strip,5 or the inhumane treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.6
1. See David Weissbrodt, The Role of the Human Rights Committee in Interpreting
and Developing Humanitarian Law, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1185, 1185 (2010); see also Joaquı´n
Ca´ceres Brun, Aspectos destacados de la aplicacio´n del derecho internacional humanitario y
de los derechos humanos, 78 LECCIONES Y ENSAYOS 49 (2003).
2. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching
the Accomplices, 83 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 842, 442–43 (2001); see also Daryl A. Mundis,
New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.
934, 935–36 (2001). For more information on the ICTY’s jurisprudence, see generally William
J. Fenrick, The Application of the Geneva Conventions by The International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia, 834 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 317 (1999) and Christa Meinder-
sma, Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as Violations of the Laws or
Customs of War under Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 42 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 375 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (indicating that High
Contracting Parties are required to “respect and ensure respect for” the Conventions); Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] (requiring
states parties to provide for effective penal sanctions against any person found to committing,
or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches under the Convention). Notably, the
Geneva Conventions do not provide for the creation of an external judicial organ charged
with the adjudication of alleged violations of IHL.
4. Case of the “Mapiripan Massacre” v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
134 (Sept. 15, 2005).
5. For example, the July 2014 bombings of the Gaza Strip by Israel in response to
Hamas rocket attacks highlight the difficulty of defining a proportional attack as permitted
under international humanitarian law. Jodi Rudoren, Civilian or Not? New Fight in Tallying
the Dead From the Gaza Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2014.
6. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Regarding the Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, Res. 2/11, Doc. MC 259–02 (July 22, 2011); see also Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1, ¶ 71 (2002), http://www.cidh
.org/terrorism/eng/part.b.htm [hereinafter Report on Terrorism and Human Rights],
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In contrast to IHL, another more recently developed sub-field of in-
ternational law has taken hold in the minds of policy-makers, jurists, and
activists. The origins of the so-called “human rights revolution” are the
subject of much recent debate and scholarship.7 Whatever the most accu-
rate history of human rights law (HRL), it has given rise to a number of
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies that provide a forum for individuals and
groups seeking to enforce their human rights against state violators. These
tribunals have expanded the world of international law throughout the
past half century. Whether their reach is international or regional in scope,
each is charged with the protection of human rights as defined by constitu-
tive treaties, to which member states willingly subject themselves.8
The impact of these tribunals on the advancement of human rights is
certainly subject to debate. Scholars do not uniformly agree that tribunals’
judgments necessarily result in the enforcement of human rights.9 Indeed,
once a judgment has been delivered by a human rights tribunal, compli-
ance with that judgment may prove elusive.10 On the other hand, tribunals
may contribute significantly to the promotion of human rights through
other secondary effects, such as human rights education, states’ fear of
being “named and shamed” within the world community, offering victims
(“[I]nternational humanitarian law treaties are to a significant extent self-regulating, as states
parties to the treaties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the terms of the agree-
ments.”); see also Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 10 Years After Detentions in
Guantanamo Began, the IACHR Repeats its Call to Close the Detention (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://.oas.org///_center///.asp.
7. See generally Keith Suter, Human Rights: A Global Revolution, 2000 AUSTL. INT’L
L.J. 25 (2000) (suggesting that the reform of global human rights has been in progress since
1945); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010) (suggesting
that the global view of human rights changed dramatically in the 1970s).
8. See, e.g., Kelly Dawn Askin, 15 Years of International Tribunals: A Brief Look at
the Past, Present, and Future of International Justice, 17 ILSA Q. 24, 24, 27–28 (2008) (finding
that the development of international tribunals has been indispensable to international jus-
tice in the last fifteen years). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, The “Horizontal” Growth of
International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges or Opportunities? 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 369, 370–71 (2002) (hypothesizing that due to the examination of international juris-
prudence by other international tribunals, there is a developing uniformity in international
law).
9. See, e.g., Alexandra Hunees, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-Amer-
ican Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, CORNELL J. OF INT’L L. 101 (2013) (high-
lighting that state enforcement of human rights judgments varies greatly depending on
whether they require action by the executive or by the justice system); Darren Hawkins &
Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts
for Human Rights, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35–85 (2010).
10. See, e.g., James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 770 (2008) (arguing that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’
most effective judgments incorporated respect for human rights into broader domestic poli-
cies affecting the underlying issues); see also Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance
with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
1994–2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2007) (discussing the direct effect of the establishment
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on ensuring compliance with
regional human rights treaties).
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symbolic victories, and deterring future violations of human rights by rais-
ing awareness.11 Regardless of how we assess the efficacy of these organs
in achieving their stated goal of protecting human rights, they have cer-
tainly produced a great deal of jurisprudence exploring the nature of
human rights law, developing interpretations of rights and, to a large ex-
tent, making human rights meaningful in the regions and the countries that
are bound by these tribunals’ decisions.12 Scholars have evaluated tribu-
nals’ varying degrees of success in enforcing human rights, as well as in
preventing human rights violations, and naming and shaming nations who
violate human rights.
And so, the stage is set. IHL lacks a forum for enforcement. Human
rights tribunals have the subject matter jurisdiction to resolve human
rights disputes. There exist significant areas of substantive overlap be-
tween humanitarian law and human rights law. This Article examines
whether, in light of this substantive overlap, human rights tribunals offer
an appropriate forum for the enforcement of IHL, despite the many chal-
lenges present in taking on this task.
These two quite distinct, and yet strikingly complementary bodies of
law pose challenges for legal scholars and practitioners seeking to under-
stand their respective scopes of application.13 While IHL was developed
for the regulation of armed conflict and HRL was designed in peacetime
conditions, at their core, these two legal regimes share many principles
aimed at the protection of human life. Despite these similarities, a number
of factors distinguish these regimes from one another, particularly when
they are contemplated by human rights tribunals. For example, HRL
never allows derogation of the right to life, while IHL, as a law of combat,
does allow for the killing of certain parties within the scope of the conflict.
Such distinctions are crucial, and are examined throughout this Article,
with the goal of exploring the following inquiries. Considering the lack of
enforcement mechanisms of IHL, should human rights bodies be tasked
with its enforcement? If so, how exactly should this task be approached in
terms of applying the law?
11. See generally Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution
and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001)
(arguing that the establishment of international tribunals and the trials of human rights viola-
tors have dissuaded political leaders from committing violations and changing the agendas of
human rights organizations); Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of
Human Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 97 (2012) (indicating that regional human rights
systems may have deterrent effects on future crimes). But see Holly Dawn Jarmul, The Effect
of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 311, 364 (1995–96) (finding that the European Court of Human Rights has not had a
significant effect on the domestic law of European States because its case law is not seen as
binding and is largely dismissed if in contradiction to the national law).
12. See generally Ariel Dulitzky, The Inter-American Human Rights System Fifty Years
Later: Time for Changes, QUE. J. INT’L L. 127 (2011); Christina Cerna, Reflections on the
Normative Status of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 30 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 1211 (2009).
13. See, e.g., Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 501, 502 (2008).
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The substantive intersections between IHL and HRL could indeed be
used as a way to promote IHL enforcement. Among the many scholars
who explore these intersections, some argue that even if the interrelation-
ship brought no more protection to individuals, the advantage of enforce-
ment of IHL would still offer reason to combine them.14 The intersections
between IHL and HRL have become increasingly fraught as some human
rights bodies and activists have proposed that human rights bodies can and
should take on the adjudication of IHL-related claims.15 In order to ex-
plore potential resolutions to this issue, this Article focuses on the varying
approaches taken within the Inter-American System of Human Rights (In-
ter-American System) in its adjudication of the intersections between IHL
and HRL. Though it has experienced ebbs and flows, tracing the system’s
evolution reveals a methodological approach toward IHL.
The answer to the normative question of how human rights tribunals
should assess IHL also depends on jurisdiction. Specifically, limitations on
jurisdiction rationae materiae in human rights organs have been cited by
both those in favor and those opposed to human rights bodies taking an
activist approach to enforcement of IHL. Some jurists have posited that
not only should human rights bodies seek to enforce IHL, but that they
are obligated by their statutes to do so.16 To the contrary, other jurists and
scholars have defended the choice not to enforce IHL, also relying on in-
terpretations of those tribunals’ jurisdictions, which are often explicitly
limited to the enforcement of human rights law.
In addition to exploring the limitations of the Inter-American Sys-
tem’s jurisdictional capacity to adjudicate issues of IHL, this Article exam-
ines Inter-American jurisprudence in light of recent scholarly
conversations regarding the relevance of the principle of lex specialis,
which seeks to guide tribunals when two bodies of law may apply simulta-
neously, by providing for the prioritization of a specialized body of law
over a general one. This concept, first articulated by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nuclear Weapons case,17 has proven to be the
source of much scholarly consternation. As a means of addressing
14. Marko Milanovic, A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship Between Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 14 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 459, 460
(2009) [hereinafter Norm Conflict] (explaining that from a human rights perspective, IHL
could “be enforced before political bodies, such as the Human Rights Council or UN political
organs more generally, or through judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms, such as the Inter-
national Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the UN treaty bodies or
domestic courts”).
15. See Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law, in F. KALSHOVEN
(ED.), THE CENTENNIAL OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: REPORTS AND
CONCLUSIONS 240–41, 251–52 (2000) (suggesting that “the monitoring mechanisms of human
rights conventions could be used in an indirect way to assist in ensuring compliance with the
law applicable in internal conflicts”).
16. See id. at 206 (discussing the inter-American commission’s defense of its directly
applying IHL in the Abella decision).
17. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8, 1996).
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problems arising from the fragmentation of international law, the concept
has a nice ring to it, but in practical terms, it has proven to be a terribly
messy concept subject to multiple interpretations. The Inter-American sys-
tem has adopted an approach to fragmentation, described here as the In-
terpretive Reference Resolution, which relies on reference to IHL, but
does not permit the direct application of that law. This method allows
tribunals to walk a delicate balance: they avoid directly finding states in
violation of norms of IHL while simultaneously incorporating IHL into
their analysis of HRL norms. This balancing act provides a novel solution
to the problem of fragmentation between IHL and HRL. Furthermore, it
has allowed human rights tribunals within the Inter-American System to
tether their findings of human rights violations to IHL. This approach, this
Article argues, is a soft law strategy with the same potential enforcement
impact as the direct finding of violations of IHL.
Therefore, this Article offers two contributions: first, it offers a nor-
mative framing for utilizing the abstract legal standard of lex specialis
when IHL and HRL may simultaneously apply, second, the Article pro-
vides an analysis of whether the use of IHL at human rights tribunals con-
tributes to the enforcement of IHL, even when it is not binding on states.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the reader with
some of the background necessary to understand the complicated question
of whether IHL can and should be evaluated at human rights tribunals. A
comparison between IHL and HRL reveals many intrinsic differences, but
also significant overlap. After exploring these parallels, the Article contex-
tualizes the conflict between IHL and HRL within the horizontal fragmen-
tation of laws, and introduces the concept of lex specialis as a means to
address the conflict of laws.
Part II uses the Inter-American System of Human Rights as a case
study to examine jurisdictional restraints that may affect a human rights
tribunal’s capacity to employ IHL in its adjudication. It highlights some of
the principle jurisdictional issues at the Inter-American System that—de-
pending on how they are interpreted—will affect the tribunals’ capacity to
adjudicate questions involving IHL. In order to understand the approach
of the Inter-American System, one must understand its rationae materiae
competence. Although this system derives its authority from treaties and
political declarations that grant jurisdiction on human rights questions,
these organs have utilized, interpreted, and in some cases, even applied
IHL.18
Part III traces the jurisprudence at both the Inter-American Commis-
sion of Human Rights (the Commission) and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (the Court) in order to demonstrate the ambivalence that
characterizes the approach taken by adjudicators in their attempts to
achieve the appropriate balance between IHL and HRL. In contributing a
framework for understanding the Inter-American System’s jurisprudence,
18. See, e.g., Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion on Human Rights].
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this Article highlights the distinction between (1) IHL as interpretive ref-
erence and (2) direct application of IHL. IHL serves as an interpretive
reference when it is employed to provide contextual interpretation and to
clarify how HRL should be interpreted in situations of armed conflict.19
Meanwhile, direct application of IHL occurs in cases where it is directly
applied by the body to find a violation thereof.20
Part IV deconstructs the enforcement approach ultimately adopted by
the Court and Commission: the interpretive reference resolution. This Part
engages with recent scholarship that critiques the opaqueness of the lex
specialis approach, insisting that a lack of clarity around its meaning has
resulted in various versions of the tool being applied by tribunals. Building
upon this scholarship, Part IV then explores the practical relevance of lex
specialis with regard to the interpretive reference approach, as exemplified
by the case law of the Inter-American System. This Part also offers a four-
step breakdown of this approach, and demonstrates its application, con-
cluding that it represents only one version of lex specialis. In addition, Part
IV returns to the question of enforcement of HRL, and evaluates the ben-
efits and drawbacks of the interpretive reference approach. Recognizing
that this approach to adjudication of IHL and HRL does not impose a
binding decision on States, it considers some of the potential concerns
raised by hard law approaches. The interpretive reference variation of lex
specialis—a soft law approach—offers advantages with regard to the pro-
motion of ideals and supports the goal of enforcement in a broader sense.
Although it is a less drastic application of IHL than finding that nations
have committed direct violations thereof, it proves a suitable means to
“humanize” IHL through its influence within decisions at human rights
tribunals.
All human rights tribunals seek to protect basic and universal human
rights. Yet, it is not uncommon for these judicial bodies to grapple with
human rights cases arising from situations of armed conflict, which of
course gives rise also to the application of IHL. Frequently, the Inter-
American Human Rights system has been confronted with the intersec-
tions between HRL and IHL.21 These occasions present the IASHR with
complex legal questions that are potentially divisive, considering that the
IASHR was created to enforce HRL, and not IHL, as part of its mandate.
Whether or not the human rights organs of the Inter-American Sys-
tem are an appropriate means of enforcement for IHL, the Commission
has taken on a notably activist role in engaging with the application of
19. See Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 158, 161 (1997) (The Commission, recognizing that
human rights instruments lack guidelines to govern warfare, decided to “look to and apply
definitional standards and relevant rules of humanitarian law as sources of authoritative gui-
dance in its resolution of this and other kinds of claims alleging violations of the American
Convention in combat situations”).
20. See id. ¶ 163.
21. Id. ¶ 160 (“It is . . . during situations of internal armed conflict that these two
branches of international law most converge and reinforce each other.”).
668 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:661
IHL.22 Further, if the IASHR declines to enforce IHL in the Americas, no
enforcement body will exist to enforce the norms of IHL. This raises im-
portant questions regarding the mission of the organs of the IASHR. Is
the system obligated to examine this law? Or, are the mechanisms of the
system not functioning at their optimal capacity if they cannot grapple
with the complicated realities of the IHL/HRL intersection? Must human
rights bodies be equipped to analyze the interplay between human rights
law and other areas of the law? These questions are critical ones; because
the IHSHR adjudicates such a large number of cases, jurisprudential
trends within this regional system may be predictive of how other regional
bodies may treat these questions. Considering the multitude of questions
raised by the intersection of these two bodies of law, significant contro-
versy remains regarding their interplay.
I. ACCOUNTING FOR IHL VIOLATIONS AT HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS
A. Challenges of Fragmentation between IHL and HRL
Potential intersections between IHL and HRL epitomize a relatively
recently identified phenomenon of international law in an increasingly
globalized and adjudicated world. Fragmentation has been defined by
Martti Koskenniemi, as the “splitting up of the law into highly specialized
‘boxes’ that claim relative autonomy from each other.”23 Antonio Cassese
describes the overlap between different areas of law as “tight legal com-
partments” that are “gradually tending to influence one another . . . and
international courts are tending to look at them as parts of a whole.”24 As
adjudicative bodies and tribunals become more and more omnipresent,
this trend of fragmentation (and the potential issues it raises) have in-
creased. For example, the Inter-American System has grappled with frag-
mentation in its analysis of the intersections between IHL and HRL,
which has raised significant concerns regarding jurisdiction of the body to
adjudicate these matters.
The interplay between HRL and IHL is a prime example of the chal-
lenges of fragmentation, as these branches of law often apply simultane-
ously. As a result, much scholarly attention has been paid to the
22. See Liesbeth Zegveld, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and In-
ternational Humanitarian Law: A Comment on the Tablada Case, 38 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
505, 505 (1998) (observing that the Commission’s decision in the 1997 La Tablada case, may
“encourage other human rights treaty bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, set up pursuant to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, to extend their supervisory functions
to international humanitarian law”); see also Shana Tabak, Armed Conflict and the Inter-
American System of Human Rights: Application or Interpretation of International Law, in
APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES
(Derek Jinks et al. eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 2014).
23. Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 13,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation of International Law].
24. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (2001).
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similarities and differences between the two areas of law.25 Significant
overlap exists between these two bodies of law, so much so that these in-
tersections can be difficult to untangle.26 The President of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) highlighted these
commonalties when he emphasized that “the common underlying purpose
of international humanitarian law and international human rights law is
the protection of the life, health and dignity of human beings.”27 Both
branches of law seek to protect individuals’ basic rights, which may be
threatened during armed conflict, whether at the hands of a State or an-
other armed party.
The commonalities between IHL and HRL are disputed, however.28
Although both regimes strive to protect life, some argue that the defining
intellectual origins of each body of law are so different that they are intrin-
sically unique, and even incompatible.29 HRL is fundamentally hostile to
war; indeed, one of the purposes of this body of law is to prevent war-
fare.30 IHL, on the other hand, takes no moral position regarding the just-
ness of war in principle; rather, it seeks to regulate it within international
25. See, e.g., Paul Eden & Matthew Happold, Symposium on the Relationship between
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, 14 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 441, 441 (2010) (exploring the intersections between international humanitarian and
human rights law within a symposium of authors); see also Droege, supra note 13, at 502;
Oona A. Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship
Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883,
1886 (2012).
26. See, e.g., Franc¸oise J. Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanita-
rian Law and International Human Rights Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549, 559 (2008);
see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction Between Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 168
(noting that “[States] are expected, at least by implication, to consider the impact of both
human rights law and humanitarian law, to reach the outcomes permissible at the level of
international law” during armed conflict).
27. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Hu-
manitarian Law and Other Legal Regimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence, Address at
the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law
(Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_851_kellenberger.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Bill Bowring, Fragmentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in the Juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 485, 485–86
(2009).
29. See Iain Scobbie, Principle or Pragmatics? The Relationship Between Human
Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, in Symposium: The Relationship Between Inter-
national Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, 14 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.
449, 456 (2010) (indicating that although some overlap exists, “there is a fundamental incom-
patibility in what [the two systems] set out to achieve. There is no over-reaching axiology, no
value system that unifies the objectives of these fields of international law.”).
30. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 158 (1997) (indicating that one of the purposes of human
rights instruments is to prevent warfare).
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law.31 As Theodore Meron explains, IHL is concerned with inserting a
modicum of fair play into conflict.32
Fragmentation becomes particularly relevant, of course, when distinct
law regimes apply simultaneously, yet offer contradicting answers to the
legal questions arising from a set of facts. HRL applies through systems of
international and regional treaties that dictate how states must treat
human beings. It applies universally during times of war and times of
peace.33 These norms protect the physical safety and well-being of all peo-
ple at all times, and serve to regulate state power between parties in an
unequal relationship of power. Indeed, human rights law offers individu-
als, groups and their advocates a novel way of engaging with states, in that
they no longer must rely on state protection, but may seek accountability
if and when states violate their human rights.34 Because of this inversion
of the traditional relationship between states and individuals, which offers
an alternative to domestic protections, HRL has been perceived as a
threat to state sovereignty.35 Various human rights conventions, treaties or
declarations have distinct enforcement means—the IASHR is just one fo-
rum where human rights may be adjudicated.36
IHL, also referred to as the law of war or jus in bello, applies during
times of armed conflict and occupation37 between parties who are consid-
31. Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: The
Politics of Distinction, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 299, 361–62 (2011).
32. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239,
241, 243–44 (2000).
33. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27, supra note 18; African
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights]; Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
34. See generally MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (U. of Pa. Press 1992) (arguing that if a state violates its interna-
tional human rights obligations, victims may seek protection from these human rights
violations).
35. See Bowring, supra note 28, at 489–90.
36. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of specific features of the IACHR.
37. Occupation for the purposes of application of IHL is defined as “effective control”
of a region, as determined by Article 42 of 1907 Hague Regulations. The definitional limits of
effective control have been discussed extensively by scholars. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra
note 25, at 1893, 1919 (“[T]here is growing consensus among international bodies and foreign
States that human rights law obligations apply abroad wherever a State exercises ‘effective
control’ over territory or individuals outside its borders . . . . States’ human rights obligations
[are] limited during battlefield hostilities because the States lack effective control.”); Christo-
pher J. Le Mon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test
Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 791–93 (2003) (discussing the “dissonance within
the law” created by the acceptance of unilateral intervention while upholding standards of
effective control and the questionable legitimacy of invited external government interven-
tion); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 109, 111-12, 116 (June 27) (finding that while the United
States closely collaborated with the contra force by providing intelligence and logistic sup-
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ered to function on a formally equivalent relationship in times of war. IHL
was first codified in the Hague Conventions (Hague Law) around the turn
of the 20th century. This set of laws addresses the governance of war, and
covers topics such as the appropriate level of retaliation, and the accepta-
bility of various military objectives and means of warfare.38 The primary
source for IHL is the Geneva Conventions, which lay out proper treat-
ment for both civilians and non-combatants.39 The Geneva Conventions’
Additional Protocols regulate the means and methods of warfare, as well
as the tactics and weapons of war.
In addition to the critical differences between IHL and HRL with re-
gard to application, a stark distinction between the two branches of inter-
national law also emerges on the point of enforcement. Enforcement of
IHL has, for the most part, been left to states parties, although more re-
cently, certain international criminal tribunals and UN bodies have sought
to utilize and potentially enforce IHL.40 The enforcement mechanisms
that have historically been available have not been regarded as very effec-
tive. These include belligerent reprisals,41 which have been long consid-
ered to be counter-productive, and have been significantly curtailed by the
Geneva Conventions.42 Additionally, the Geneva Conventions created a
doctrine called the “Protecting Powers” Doctrine, which has only been
used on four occasions with limited success.43 One other potential enforce-
port, the U.S. “operational support” did not “justify treating the contras as acting on its
behalf,” precluding the claim of effective control).
38. See generally Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
39. See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3.
40. For discussion of international criminal tribunals seeking to utilize IHL, see gener-
ally Robert Cryer, The Interplay of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: The
Approach of the ICTY, 14 J. CONFLICT SECURITY L. 511 (2009); for discussion of U.N. bodies
analyzing IHL, see generally Roscini, Marco, The United Nations Security Council and the
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 43 ISR. L. REV. 330, 330–59 (2010).
41. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Re-
prisals, 20 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 35, 38 (1989).
42. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 46, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art.
47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 3, art. 33; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 20, 51(6), 52(1), 53(c),
55(2), 56(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see also Shane
Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 175 MIL. L. REV. 184, 199–216
(2003); Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent Re-
prisals in International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155, 164–70 (2001).
43. See Christine Byron, A Blurring of Boundaries: The application of IHL by Interna-
tional Human Rights Bodies, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 839, 843 (2006–07), Geneva Convention I,
supra note 42, arts. 8, 10; Geneva Convention II, supra note 42, arts. 8, 10; Geneva Conven-
tion III, supra note 42, arts. 39, 77, 86–87; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, arts. 9, 11.
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ment mechanism is advocacy by the ICRC, a non-judicial body with a
mandate aimed at protecting individual victims of armed conflict from vio-
lations of IHL.44 Under the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC may take a
role in enforcement of IHL, due to its mandate which includes intervening
and accounting for violations if no protecting powers are appointed, and
visiting prisoners of war.45
Despite the existence of a variety of treaties that codify state obliga-
tions under IHL, it is often criticized as taking on little practical meaning
during conflict. This can be attributed in part to the lack of any viable
means for enforcement of IHL. One option to remedy this concern, as
proposed by some scholars, would be the creation of a particular adjudica-
tive body specifically aimed at regulating IHL,46 though some find this
proposal to be impracticable.47 Due to the endemic weaknesses within
each of the potential mechanisms for enforcement of IHL, activists and
jurists have increasingly turned to international and regional human rights
tribunals in attempts to resolve violations of IHL and to hold states ac-
countable.48 It is also argued that the void of enforcement of IHL should
be filled through the utilization of HRL at human rights tribunals.49
Aside from a comparison of the common goals, application, and en-
forcement challenges within these two areas of law, another critical dis-
tinction between IHL and HRL is whether these laws are derogable or
not. Human rights treaties allow for some margin of derogation, but only
in circumstances that pose extreme danger to the self or to the nation.
IHL, on the other hand, is never derogable. These divergences are critical
when IHL and HRL both apply to a common set of facts. The close exami-
nation of two specific rights under both IHL and HRL in the subsequent
paragraphs reveals this distinction: the right to life (which is non-dero-
gable under HRL) and the right to personal liberty (which is derogable).
The human right to life, which is non-derogable, may receive distinct
treatment within the context of IHL, and the interplay between IHL and
HRL is evident in the analysis of this right. This right, protected under
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR” or
44. See THE ICRC’S MANDATE AND MISSION, https://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/
mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
45. See, e.g., Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (providing, inter alia,
that “[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict”); Geneva Convention III, supra
note 42, art. 10 (“The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross. . . may, subject
to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prison-
ers of war and for their relief.”).
46. See Jann Kleffner & Liesbeth Zegveld, Establishing an Individual Complaints Pro-
cedure for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 3 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.
384, 386 (2000).
47. See Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Pro-
tection and International Humanitarian Law, 856 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 789, 798–99 (2004).
48. Byron, supra note 43, at 847.
49. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 15.
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“the Convention”), may never be suspended.50 Yet under IHL, deadly
force is permitted against combatants until they have been captured, re-
flecting IHL’s inherent agnostic approach toward the practice of war. Fur-
thermore, civilians lose their immunity under IHL as soon as they
participate in combat.51 Therefore, if a person has been killed by a state
during conflict, in order to determine whether there has been a violation
of the right to life, that person’s status as a possible combatant must be
clarified. If so, then under IHL the right to life has not been violated by
the State.52 Consequently, if a killing is categorized under IHL as being
against a combatant, then this killing would not constitute a violation of
the non-derogable right to life under the ACHR.53
The right to personal liberty further reveals the complicated interac-
tion between HRL and IHL. This right covers an individual’s claim to
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. Under Article 27 of the
ACHR, any derogation must be exceptional and temporary, and the
state’s power to suspend this right during times of armed conflict is strictly
defined.54 For example, interpretations of the rights of Prisoners of War
(POWs), who are interned for reasons of military necessity, may be dis-
tinct under these separate regimes. IHL permits the detention of POWs as
an incidence of war, and therefore they need not be afforded procedural
protections under the third Geneva Convention. Had these same individu-
als been categorized as non-combatants, however, they would be granted
such protections, including judicial review and freedom from arbitrary ar-
rest or detention.55 Thus, a State may be permitted to treat POWs one way
under IHL, and civilians another way under HRL. Circumstances exist in
which the existence of armed conflict necessitates the consideration of
both IHL and HRL for these populations.
The potential for simultaneous or parallel applicability of IHL and
HRL has raised controversy amongst scholars and jurists. Clearly, IHL
applies during armed conflict, yet courts have struggled to understand how
to apply IHL during conflict while maintaining the integrity of the basic
principles of HRL. What is the proper role of an adjudicative body in ad-
dressing this overlap–especially one whose mandate is dedicated to pro-
tection of human rights? As is explored in the following section, the legal
principle of lex specialis offers some guidance, but not absolute clarity.
50. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 4.
51. Meron, supra note 32, at 240.
52. See Robert Goldman, Extraterritorial Application of the Human Right to Life and
Personal Liberty, Including Habeas Corpus, During Situations of Armed Conflict, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 104, 112 (Robert Kolb &
Gloria Gaggioli eds., 2013).
53. See Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1997).
54. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 27.
55. Goldman, supra note 52, at 118.
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B. The Putative Lex Specialis Solution to Fragmentation
In the ICJ’s analysis of the IHL and HRL overlap, the Court has de-
termined that the two areas of law do indeed apply conterminously.56 Al-
though the ICJ’s subject matter jurisdiction is not limited by a human
rights statute,57 which may undermine the feasibility of applying its hold-
ing at a tribunal with more conscribed subject matter jurisdiction, its ex-
ploration of the intersection between the two branches of law is accepted
by most international law experts.
In resolving the legal questions that arise at the convergence between
these two areas of law, the ICJ’s position reflects a classic solution to the
concern of fragmentation of international law, relying on the interpretive
principle of lex specialis. The International Law Committee (ILC), the pri-
mary interpretive body of international law norms, explains that “the
maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali is a generally accepted technique
of interpretation and conflict resolution in international law. It suggests
that whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, pri-
ority should be given to the norm that is more specific.”58 Although the
ICJ has not strayed from this articulated position regarding the intersec-
tion of the two bodies of law, application of the rule has oftentimes proven
more complicated than the ICJ’s rule may reveal.59
Three important cases at the ICJ reveal the development of the
Court’s position. In the Wall case, the ICJ found that HRL applies as lex
specialis during armed conflict, as the “protection offered by human rights
conventions does not cease in the case of armed conflict.”60 The Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of Threat of Nuclear Weapons sought to answer
whether the use of nuclear weapons was to be interpreted as a violation of
the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, protected
56. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 25 (July 8, 1996).
57. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
58. Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 23, ¶ 5.
59. Hampson, supra note 26, at 571 (indicating that the decisions at the ICJ have not
fully resolved questions about the relationship of the two bodies of law).
60. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9, 2004); see Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25.
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under Article 6 of the ICCPR.61 Because Article 6 is non-derogable, the
Court determined that it applied continuously, even within armed conflict.
In such a context when IHL and HRL applied conterminously, the Court
indicated that IHL was to apply as lex specialis. As a result, the term “arbi-
trary” within ICCPR Article 6 was to be defined according to IHL.62 In-
deed, the term lex specialis was first utilized by the Court in its judgment
describing how to integrate IHL and HRL:
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary depriva-
tion of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable
lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict, which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in war-
fare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to
Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the
law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms
of the Covenant itself.63
Marco Milanovic posits that this important cite from the Nuclear
Weapons case may have been the first instance in which the term lex
specialis was utilized.64 Whether or not this claim holds to be true, the
Nuclear Weapons case doubtlessly has come to be the dominant case artic-
61. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judg-
ment rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation
of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be
granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
62. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25.
63. Id.
64. Marko Milanovic, The Genesis of Lex Specialis, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 30, 2014), http:/
/.ejiltalk.org/-of-lex-specialis/.
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ulating the principle of lex specialis, providing that IHL prevails when both
IHL and HRL are applicable.65 In practical terms, this holding indicates
that within combat, the right to life guaranteed in Article 6 of the ICCPR
should be analyzed in light of IHL. Therefore, deaths that are legitimate
under the laws of war as pertaining to military combat cannot be found to
violate the right to life protected by Article 6.
Subsequent ICJ cases reiterated the continual application of HRL
during instances of armed conflict. The Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory demonstrated that the right to life is to be interpreted only ac-
cording to IHL as lex specialis, because norms developed for peacetime
cannot be applied in an unqualified manner during conflict.66
Notwithstanding the ICJ’s clear message that HRL does indeed apply
during wartime, courts still face murky waters in their adjudication of facts
when these two bodies of law intersect. These cases, and the intersection
of IHL and HRL within them, are examined in detail in Section II of this
Article. Scholars have spilled much ink attempting to determine the prac-
tical implications of the ICJ’s decision:
[f]irst, that where both IHL and human rights law are applicable,
priority should be given to IHL. Second, given the ICJ’s view that
human rights law remains applicable at all times, by necessary im-
plication the ICJ also meant that the human rights body should
make a finding based on IHL and expressed in the language of
human rights law.67
But despite this seemingly clear interpretation, other scholars have
claimed the ICJ’s resolution on this question was perhaps so ineffectual
and impracticable that, in a later holding, it neglected to use the very term
lex specialis, which it had previously relied upon as a clarifying principle.68
Whether or not the ICJ’s holdings provide clarity on the lex specialis
approach to overlap between IHL and HRL, regional human rights sys-
tems are nevertheless confronted with additional concerns separate from
the substantive question of which law to apply. The ICJ is a tribunal whose
subject matter jurisdiction is not limited by a human rights statute,69 which
potentially undercuts the feasibility of applying its holding to a tribunal
65. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25.
66. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9, 2004); see also Armed Activ-
ities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
Rep. 168, ¶¶ 216–20 (Dec. 19).
67. Hampson, supra note 26, at 559.
68. See Milanovic, Norm Conflict, supra note 14, at 464 (noting that when quoting
dictum from the Wall case, the ICJ omitted its prior reference to lex specialis from the
Court’s analysis in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda)).
69. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 38
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
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with a more conscribed subject matter jurisdiction. This universal subject
matter jurisdiction at the ICJ means that it is permitted to hear claims that
originate in nearly any area of public international law, including the al-
leged violation of human rights treaties.70 Judges at the ICJ are also less
constrained than those at regional tribunals, since the statutes of regional
tribunals may explicitly limit consideration of areas of law not referred to
under their statutes.71
The potential for conflicting outcomes presents unique challenges for
any judicial body attempting to evaluate a set of facts where both IHL and
HRL may apply, such as in situations of occupation or armed conflict. In
particular, the utilization of IHL by human rights tribunals has led to sig-
nificant controversy, since important distinctions and interpretations of
terminology exist between the two areas. Finders of fact at human rights
tribunals face an additional challenge above and beyond the substantive
question of how these two areas of law should interface, and what the
appropriate understanding of the lex specialis approach indicates. Human
rights tribunals, such as those in the Inter-American System, are limited in
their subject matter jurisdiction to human rights claims against States and
to evaluation of breaches of law as specifically permitted by their constitu-
tive instruments.72
These challenges of enforcement of IHL are reflected in a series of
cases evaluated by the Inter-American System. That the ICJ’s holdings,
offering the difficult-to-apply lex specialis standard when HRL and IHL
intersect, do not provide much clarity is evidenced by the jurisprudence in
the Inter-American System. There, Commissioners and Justices have grap-
pled with multiple cases stemming from decades of armed conflict and
struggled with the appropriate balance between IHL and HRL.73
More recently, U.S. detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay has
also provoked questions regarding the appropriate interplay between
HRL and IHL, and whether a human rights tribunal could seek to enforce
IHL.74 In these cases, the Inter-American System has been confronted
with practical contexts that have merited exploration of how to best apply
the ICJ lex specialis standard. These practical challenges are complicated
by the need for the adjudicators of the IASHR to first consider whether
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
70. See id.
71. See Escorihuela, supra note 31, at 377.
72. Id.
73. See section III, infra.
74. See Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 6, at 76-86.
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they are competent to hear such claims in the first place. These challenges,
and adjudicators’ oscillating approaches to them, are tackled in the next
Section.
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM:
COMPETENCE DURING CONFLICT
When confronted with cases in which the alleged rights violations stem
from facts occurring during armed conflict, the Commission’s approach in
recent years to the enforcement of IHL has boomeranged back and forth.
In several early cases, the Commission determined that it was permitted to
engage in the direct application of IHL, which resulted in findings that
several states under its jurisdiction had committed violations thereof. De-
spite this progressive stance, the Court has since undermined the holding
through case law supporting the consideration of IHL as an interpretive
device for the application of HRL, but not supporting the direct finding of
IHL violations. These patterns in the jurisprudence can be traced directly
to the instruments of the Inter-American System as created by its constitu-
tive charter.
When regional human rights systems, such as the IASHR, handle
cases that address the intersection between IHL and HRL, the judgments
emitted offer practical application of these laws to facts on the ground.75
Despite this, the judicial constraints of the statutes, rather than the inter-
play of the two areas of law, have been dominant within these cases.76 This
is a result of the rigid constraints of the IASHR’s constitutive statutes,
which permit only human rights claims to be adjudicated. Before describ-
ing these patterns in the jurisprudence, this Article offers a brief overview
of the regional system of human rights, its judicial and quasi-judicial or-
gans, and its sources of authority.
A. Evolution of the Inter-American Human Rights System
Over the past fifty years, the Inter-American System has developed
into a complex scheme of human rights organs that share the common
mission of supporting States and individuals in the protection of human
rights throughout the western hemisphere. Consisting of the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission of Human Rights, based in Washington D.C., and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), located in San Jose,
Costa Rica, the Inter-American System was created by the Organization
of American States (OAS).77 These instruments have worked for over a
half-century to seek accountability from states that have committed
75. See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 161 (1997).
76. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 1991 Annual Report, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc. 7, 18 (1992).
77. Christina M. Cerna, Out of Bounds? The Approach of the Inter-American System
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to the Extraterritorial Application of
Human Rights Law, 1 (Ctr. for Hum. Rts. and Global Justice, Working Paper No. 6, 2006).
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human rights abuses, especially during times of military dictatorships,
forced disappearances, and mass displacement.78 Yet this era has also wit-
nessed a human rights revolution of sorts in Latin America, in which coun-
tries and NGOs have worked to secure accountability for past abuses, and
succeeded in garnering global attention.79 Standards have been set that
seek to prevent and account for human rights violations that may be
ongoing.80
The development of legal mechanisms within the Inter-American Sys-
tem has progressed as an iterative process over the past fifty years. As a
result, the system is quite complex in its organization. In 1949, the member
States of the OAS passed The Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man (ADRDM),81 which in 1948 became the first regional human rights
resolution, coterminous with the creation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.82 At the time of its passage,
the Declaration was not viewed as binding, but as hortatory.83 It was de-
termined by the Court that the Declaration had achieved normative status
by reference into the OAS Charter, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos
Aires.84 In 1981, eleven years later, the OAS created the Commission as
an autonomous and permanent organ of the OAS. At the time of its
founding, the Commission aimed to promote the observance and defense
of human rights throughout the region.85 Although it is not a juridical
body officially, it was granted the authority to apply the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man. In 1968 it began the evaluation of
individual petitions alleging violations of human rights within member
States of the OAS.86 The existence of the Commission, and its capacity to
engage on an individual level with specific cases significantly raised the
78. See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 500 (2011) (“[T]he
Inter-American Court started life grappling with systematic state-sponsored mass crimes.”).
79. THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (Akira Iriye et
al. eds., 2012); Amy Gutman, Introduction to MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS
POLITICS AND IDOLATRY, at vii, vii-viii (Amy Gutman ed., 2001).
80. See generally Dulitzky, supra note 12.
81. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man arts. XVIII, XXV, XXVI, Apr. 30, 1948 [hereinafter American Declaration].
82. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
83. Cerna, supra note 12, at 1211 (“The American Declaration, like the contempora-
neous but better-known Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was never intended to be a
legally-binding instrument.”).
84. See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advi-
sory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 43–48 (July 14, 1989).
85. Id.
86. See Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, art. 1, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (Oct. 1979), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6
rev.1 at 93 (1992).
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stakes of human rights enforcement within the Americas, breathing new
life into the Declaration and multiplying its normative value within the
Americas as a mechanism for protecting human rights.87
The OAS continued to develop more opportunities for enforcement of
human rights treaties in 1979 with the creating of the Convention. The
Convention, which is binding on states that have signed onto it,88 grants
the Court jurisdiction to adjudicate only those cases brought against signa-
tories to the Convention.89 Of the twenty-five countries that have ratified
the Convention, twenty-two of those have also ceded binding jurisdiction
to the Inter-American Court.90 This aspect of the Court’s jurisdiction dis-
tinguishes it markedly from the Commission, which lacks an express juris-
dictional scope. Jurisdiction becomes particularly relevant in considering
the role of the United States within the Inter-American System. Because
the United States is a signatory to the American Declaration but not to
the Convention, matters concerning human rights violations by the United
States are heard by the Commission, not by the Court. Former human
rights specialist at the Commission Christina Cerna explains,
this lack of an express jurisdictional scope is relevant since most of
the examples from the inter-American system, involving the ex-
traterritorial application of its human rights instruments, concern
the United States, which has not ratified the American Conven-
tion and which is considered by the Inter-American Commission
to be subject to the American Declaration.91
87. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human
Rights, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 835 (1975).
88. See American Declaration, supra note 81, arts. XXIX-XXXVIII. The ACHR in-
corporated the rights that had previously been included in the ADRDM, and thus the Com-
mission’s mandate was redefined with this passage of the ACHR, although its existence
formally predates the ACHR. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 1
The States Parties to the Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for rea-
sons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
89. The jurisdiction of the Court is set out in articles 61-64 of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, arts. 61–64.
90. The twenty-two states that have both ratified the American Convention and also
accepted the binding jurisdiction of the Court are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Me´xico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay and Venezuela. However, Trinidad and Tobago renounced the Convention, and
withdrew from the Court’s jurisdiction, in 1999. Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
History (English version), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-
corteidh [hereinafter Inter-American Court Information].
91. Christina M. Cerna, Out of Bounds? The Approach of the Inter-American System
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to the Extraterritorial Application of
Human Rights Law (Ctr. for Hum. Rts. and Global Justice, Working Paper No. 6, 2006). The
unique relationship between the Commission and the United States becomes particularly
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A final comment regarding the relationship between the Commission
and the Court regards the role of precedent and deference. Due to the
nature of the Court’s authority as treaty-based, and the Commission’s as
declaration-based, the Court is understood to be the higher authority, with
binding jurisdiction for States who have agreed to it.92 Therefore, although
the Commission is not per se obligated to follow the holdings of the Court,
the two judicial organs have a symbiotic relationship. The interrelationship
between the Court and the Commission, and in particular the deference
traditionally granted to the former by the latter, both figure prominently
in the Inter-American System’s approach to the integration of IHL within
human rights cases at those tribunals.
B. Competence at the Inter-American System
The constitutive instruments that created the Inter-American System
—the OAS Charter, the ADRDM, and the ACHR — delineate the spe-
cific human rights protected within the system. The Inter-American Sys-
tem also applies other international instruments and covenants on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCRs), Death Penalty, Torture,
Forced Disappearances, Violence against Women, and Discrimination
against Persons with Disabilities.93 In order to determine what rights a
regional human rights body may enforce, one must look to that body’s
significant in light of ongoing adjudication surrounding detention at the Guantanamo Bay
Detention facility. See discussion infra Parts III.C and IV.B.
92. See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439,
443–44 (1990); id. at 451 (highlighting instances in which the Commission asked the Court for
advisory opinions); id. at 453 (discussing the opinion of the Court in the advisory opinion
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism,
in which it finds that the Commission has a duty to present to it contentious cases). See
generally Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Prece-
dents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297 (1994).
93. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, pmbl. (“Considering that
these principles. . . have been reaffirmed and refined in other international instruments,
worldwide as well as regional in scope.”). See generally “Other Treaties” Subject to the Con-
sultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Advi-
sory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, ¶ 42 (Sept. 24, 1982), http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4a.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2016); id. ¶ 52 (Determin-
ing that advisory jurisdiction of the Court may apply when it regards the protection of human
rights laid out in “any international treaty applicable in the American States, regardless of
whether it be bilateral or multilateral, whatever be the principal purpose of such a treaty, and
whether or not non-Member States of the inter-American system are or have the right to
become parties thereto”); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 64; see
Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya U´beda de Torres, La guerra de la Jurisprudencia de la
Corte Interamaericana de Derechos Humanos, 3 ANUARIO COLOMBIAN DE DERECHO INTER-
NACIONAL [ACDI] BOGOTA 117, 135 (2010) (Col.) (discussing the Court’s Advisory Opinion
on Other Treaties and reiterating that although the Court has granted legitimacy to an au-
thentic interpretive strategy with regard to other treaties, this does not imply that these trea-
ties may actually be applied by the Court: “lo cual se ha convertido en una aute´ntica
estrategia interpretativa, eso no implica que dichos tratados puedan ser aplicables a los casos
que la Corte debe examinar”).
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constitutive instrument. Article 44 of the Statute of the Commission indi-
cates that “only denunciations or complaints of violations to the treaty
itself by state parties can be dealt with and can provide a basis for pro-
ceedings.”94 As such, only violations of the ADRDM, and subsequently
the ACHR, may be addressed by the Commission. According to the
Court’s interpretation of Article 44 regarding jurisdiction rationae mater-
iae, examination of claims under any law other than the ACHR would
violate the principle of “express consent” as articulated under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This principle provides that
state action may only be adjudicated with regard to a particular treaty if
the state has consented to that treaty.95
The VCLT provides for a treaty to be interpreted in good faith with
the ordinary meaning of its language, considering the object and purpose
of the treaty.96 Indeed, a former judge of the IACtHR reiterates the im-
portance of honoring this VCLT requirement. Professor Rafael Nieto
Navia argues that recourse may be had to a supplemental means of inter-
pretation only when ordinary interpretation leaves the meaning ambigu-
ous or obscure, or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable, and that none of the language in the ACHR is ambiguous.97
As demonstrated by the conflicting perspectives of the Commission and
the Court, esteemed jurists in both these bodies disagree on this point.
Situations of armed conflict, during which facts may implicate viola-
tions of both IHL and HRL, present several inter-related challenges for
adjudicative bodies. First, there are multiple cases arising from armed con-
flict situations in which IHL and HRL apply simultaneously, yet would
proscribe divergent outcomes. Thus, this parallel application of the two
bodies of law may obfuscate interpretation of either area of the law. For
example, the difficulty of interpretation is evidenced through examination
94. Emiliano Buis, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law by Human
Rights Courts: The Example of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 269, 277 (Roberta Arnold & Noe¨lle Que´nivet eds., 2008).
95. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
96. Id. art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”). See generally Ulf Linderfalk, On the Meaning of the ‘Object and Pur-
pose’ Criterion, in the Context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 72 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 429, 433–34 (2003) (stating that in order to find the object and purpose of a treaty,
one must: 1) assess its telos; and 2) assess it against the rights and obligations to which the
treaty gives expression).
97. See Rafael Nieto-Navia, The Inter-American System, in RESPECTING INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, 36TH ROUND TABLE ON CUR-
RENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Sept. 5–7, 2013), 133, 137 (Michel
Veuthey ed., 2014); see also Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 259, ¶¶ 187, 211. As
described by former ICTY Judge and former IACtHR President Rafael Nieto-Navia in eval-
uating these legal principles, the Court relied on the expertise provided by the ICRC in its
publication compiling International Humanitarian Law.
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of the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life or arbitrary ar-
rest or imprisonment.98 How should the term “arbitrary” be best under-
stood in these contexts? Depending on a judicial organ’s reliance on the
meaning of this term under IHL, vastly different interpretations may arise,
leading to a variety of practical challenges.
In addition to the problem of obfuscated interpretation, procedural or
institutional impediments within certain adjudicative bodies may block the
parallel application of IHL and HRL. Substantive legal confusion has in-
deed presented challenges of interpretation within the jurisprudence of
the Commission, but these substantive problems have proved less chal-
lenging than procedural questions regarding the jurisdiction of various
bodies within Inter-American System’s enforce IHL.99
The constitutive documents of the instruments of the Inter-American
System shed light onto these jurisdictional concerns. Jurisdiction rationae
materiae (or subject matter jurisdiction) refers to a tribunal’s authority to
decide a particular case.100 The Court’s jurisdiction rationae materiae is
limited by Article 62(3) of the ACHR.101 Although this Article deter-
mines jurisdiction, the Court’s case law is critical in understanding how
limited the body is in its capacity to adjudicate matters regarding the inter-
sections of IHL and HRL.102
These jurisdictional constraints have resulted “in a clear bias in favor
of HRL when human rights bodies within the Inter-American System ex-
amine legal facts in which both IHL and HRL could apply.”103 According
to Oona Hathaway, this bias is due to jurisdictional restraints built into the
ACHR.104 This bias, however, remained unclear until the Court ultimately
and definitively imposed this restriction in the seminal Las Palmeras case.
The Court opined that “the American Convention . . . has only given the
Court competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of the
States are compatible with the Convention itself, and not with the 1949
98. See generally Goldman, supra note 52.
99. See Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 6, ¶ 116 (discussing the
right to life and terrorism, the IACHR Report on Terrorism States “additional procedural
requirements, such as the notification of Protecting Powers, may apply based upon the lex
specialis of international humanitarian law governing international armed conflicts”).
100. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 62(3) (stating that
the Court’s jurisdiction includes “all cases concerning the interpretation and application of
the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to
the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursu-
ant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement”).
101. Id.
102. See LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA U´BEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE-LAW AND COMMENTARY 67–68 (Rosalind
Greenstein, trans., 2011).
103. Shana Tabak, Armed Conflict and the Inter-American System of Human Rights:
Application or Interpretation of International Law? in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES (D. Jinks et al. eds., 2014).
104. See Hathaway et al., supra note 25, at 1909.
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Geneva Conventions.”105 Thus, if the Court desires to interpret or evalu-
ate legal norms not explicitly contemplated by the Convention, these
norms still must be interpreted vis-a`-vis the Convention.106
III. AMBIVALENCE TOWARD INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The appropriate level of involvement for human rights tribunals with
the law of armed conflict has proven to be an enduring question. Taken as
a whole, Commissioners and Court Justices have demonstrated great am-
bivalence toward the notion that a human rights tribunal is responsible for
IHL enforcement. Not only have they refused to find these tribunals re-
sponsible, but some jurists and scholars have even questioned the capacity,
under the confines of the statute, to rule on IHL violations and conse-
quently, to find that States had committed violations of IHL.
In recent years, the respective approaches of the Court and of the
Commission to situations in which armed conflict exists have coalesced to
a large degree. Currently, the Commission holds that IHL does not dis-
place HRL during armed conflict, and that HRL always remains fully ap-
plicable aside from permissible derogations.107 The Court, too, has held
that IHL and HRL share a common origin of non-derogable rights.108 De-
spite the shared theoretical rooting of the two bodies and similar interpre-
tive methods with regard to the application of IHL, for several years, they
diverged significantly and quite controversially in their approach to the
analysis of IHL within the context of human rights claims arising during
armed conflict.
Since 1997, the Commission has experimented with two distinct ap-
proaches to the employment of IHL.109 First, taking a more dramatic and
controversial stance, in several seminal early cases, the Commission deter-
mined that it was competent to determine whether States had explicitly
violated IHL or not.110 Second, in some factual situations that gave rise to
allegations of violations of the ACHR, the Commission turned to IHL as
an interpretive tool.111 This employment of IHL as authoritative guidance
in interpreting the American Convention and Declaration during armed
105. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 33 (Feb. 4, 2000).
106. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
107. See Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 6, ¶¶ 61–78.
108. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 39 (1999).
109. See Avila´n v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 202; (1998); Hugo Bustios Saavedra v. Peru, Case 10.548,
Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 88 (1998);
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1997).
110. See Avila´n, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 202; Hugo Bustios Saavedra,
Case 10.548, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R. ¶ 61 (1998); Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R. ¶ 178 (1997).
111. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 157.
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combat tracks the IHL as lex specialis approach.112 Importantly, these two
approaches, in several early cases at least, were applied conterminously
and were not deemed incompatible. To this day, the Commission contin-
ues to apply IHL as lex specialis in an interpretive capacity, but has ceased
to directly apply IHL or to find direct violations thereof have been com-
mitted by States parties.113 This retreat from judicial activism can largely
be attributed to traditional deference to the Court’s authority.
The approach of the Court toward integration of IHL standards has
been consistently more orthodox and formalist than that of the Commis-
sion. The Court has never advocated direct application of IHL by the in-
struments of the Inter-American System. This position was articulated in
Las Palmeras, in which the Court determined that the Commission had
overstepped in its finding that Colombia had breached its obligations
under IHL. Citing jurisdictional rationale to buttress this position, the
Court held that, “the American Convention. . . has only given the Court
competence to determine whether the acts or norms of the States are com-
patible with the Convention.”114
Although the Court has declined to find States directly in breach of
IHL, it has acknowledged that IHL may be, and occasionally should be,
employed to assist in the unpacking of human rights norms that may be
violated by states during conflict. It has thus rejected any direct applica-
tion of IHL on jurisdictional grounds, but it does refer to IHL and consid-
ers it in an advisory capacity.115 A chronological exploration of some of
the most relevant cases within the IAHR System highlights this pattern.
A. The Commission: IHL Applied Directly and Employed
as Interpretive Reference
In several early cases the Commission demonstrated that it found it-
self to be competent to apply the law of armed conflict, despite its being
an adjudicative body primarily concerned with human rights. A 1997 Com-
mission Report discussed three cases in which the Commission sought to
determine whether States had committed direct violations of IHL:116 Avi-
la´n v. Colombia,117 Hugo Bustios Saavedra v. Peru,118 and Abella v. Ar-
112. Goldman, supra note 52, at 112.
113. See Lindsay Moir, Law and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 25 HUM.
RTS. Q. 182, 212 (2003).
114. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67 ¶ 33 (Feb. 4, 2000).
115. See Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 1186 n.6.
116. 1997 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.98 doc. 6 rev. (1998).
117. Avila´n v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
118. Hugo Bustios Saavedra v. Peru, Case 10.548, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No.
38/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 88 (1998). In this case against Peru, the Commission
found State violations of IHL: “With respect to the right to life of Hugo Bustı´os Saavedra
and the personal integrity of Eduardo Rojas Arce, the Peruvian State has also violated com-
mon Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.” Id. ¶ 88.
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gentina.119 In each of these cases, State-perpetrated violence was analyzed
in situations that were classified as internal armed conflicts. In its evalua-
tion of these scenarios, the Commission applied IHL and laid out the ra-
tionale for why it was competent to find direct violations of IHL.
Avila´n v. Colombia addressed the rights of eleven individuals who had
been extra-judicially executed during a confrontation between the Colom-
bian army and an armed dissident group.120 The Commission’s report de-
tailed State violations of multiple articles of the ACHR. In addition, it also
determined that the state had violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.121 Strikingly, the Commission raised the IHL violation sua
sponte; it was not alleged within the victims’ initial petition.122 In defense
of this choice, the Commission explained that due to the context in which
the human rights violations occurred – armed conflict – the case required
the application of IHL for proper analysis. In doing so, it built upon the
Court’s holding in Velazquez-Rodriguez: that the law would be applicable
under the principle of “iura novit curia, on which international jurispru-
dence has repeatedly relied and under which a court has the power and
the duty to apply the juridical provisions relevant to a proceeding, even
when the parties do not expressly invoke them.”123 The Commission also
explained that “[i]t is precisely in situations of internal armed conflict that
human rights and humanitarian law converge most precisely and reinforce
one another.”124 This reasoning in Avila´n led to the Commission’s deter-
mination that the state of Colombia was in violation of Common Article 3.
A second case, Abella v. Argentina, discussed in the Commission’s
1997 report also demonstrates the Commission’s controversial choice to
apply IHL. Importantly, in Abella, the Commission emphasized that it had
the capacity to find that the Argentine State had committed a violation of
IHL, yet in this instance, they found that Argentina had not committed
such a violation.125 In the facts giving rise to this case, a military base in
Argentina was attacked by armed combatants, holding 42 people hostage.
In the Argentine military’s efforts to recapture the base, 29 of the attack-
119. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997).
120. Avila´n v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 134 (1998).
121. Id. (“The evidence submitted in this case supports the petitioners’ claim that the
victims were executed extra-judicially by state agents in a clear violation of Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions as well as the American Convention.”).
122. Id. ¶ 169 (“The State notes that none of the parties invoked humanitarian law in
this case.”).
123. Vela´squez-Rodrı´guez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶
163 (July 29, 1988). In that case, the Court found that it could order the State to investigate
and punish the Plaintiff’s disappearance under article 63(1) of the American Convention,
even if that Article was not specifically invoked by the parties.
124. Avila´n, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ¶ 174.
125. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 180 (1997).
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ers were killed in the confrontation.126 Abella was lodged by the surviving
attackers, who alleged that Argentina was responsible for violations of
HRL as well as of IHL – specifically claiming that the state had violated
Article 4 of the ACHR, protecting right to life, as well as the right to life
under IHL. These claims were rooted in the allegation that the military
had refused the attackers’ offers to surrender, and further, that they had
used weapons designed to induce disproportionate injury.127 On the mer-
its, the Commission examined whether it had the capacity to apply IHL
directly, and it found that it was indeed competent to do so. Despite its
assertion that it had the competence to find a direct violation of IHL, the
Commission found that the killings were sanctioned under IHL due to the
status of the victims as combatants. Therefore, no arbitrary deprivation of
life had occurred.128
Both Avilan and Abella highlight the two distinct techniques em-
ployed by the Commission in its analysis of the intersection between HRL
and IHL during armed conflict. First, the Commission employed direct
application of IHL to find (or decline to find) state violations thereof, and
second, it employed IHL as an interpretive device to aid in its evaluation
of the human rights violations at hand. The Commission’s defense of its
power to apply IHL relied on numerous grounds: on the overlapping
scope of HRL and IHL, and on Articles 25, 27, 29(d) and 64(1) of the
Convention.129 Each of these defenses for the Commission’s use of IHL is
discussed in detail below. Critically, aside from the Commission’s defense
of IHL due to its overlapping scope with HRL, the Commission’s defense
refers specifically to the utilization of IHL as an interpretive reference for
application of HRL, and not to its direct application of IHL.
In defense of its position that it was entitled to apply IHL directly and
to find violations thereof, the Commission explained that enforcement of
IHL within the Inter-American System should pose no additional burden
to States. Due to the overlap of the scope of application of HRL and IHL,
it explained, it was no more burdensome to apply IHL than it was to only
apply HRL.130 Further, the Commission explained, “integral linkage be-
tween the law of human rights and humanitarian law. . . share[s] ‘a com-
mon nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting
human life and dignity,’ [thereby]. . .result[ing] in in a substantial overlap
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶¶ 327–28. The Commission concluded that Argentina did not violate the appli-
cable provisions of international humanitarian law.
129. Each of these respective articles is discussed infra at 129-32. For an in-depth analy-
sis of the way in which these defenses were discussed by the Commission, see Moir, supra
note 113, at 194.
130. See Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ¶ 158; see also Avila´n v. Colom-
bia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev.
¶ 172 (1998).
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in the application of these bodies of law.”131 Some human rights advocates
encourage the use of IHL to fill enforcement gaps present within the IHL
system. This theory is based on the common ideology and core principles
shared between IHL and HRL.132
Further articulating a defense for the use of IHL as an interpretive
device, the Commission relied on Article 29(d) of the Convention, which
precludes interpretation of the Convention in a manner inconsistent with
the other international law obligations of a member State.133 This logic
was applied in Abella, where Argentina’s killing of the Tablada attackers
was analyzed to determine whether the State had violated ACHR Article
4’s right to life protection.134 In doing so, however, reference to the
ACHR alone was insufficient, because it does not offer any meaningful
guidance in distinguishing between civilians and legitimate military targets
in the context of armed conflict. Thus, the Commission explained, IHL
provided the necessary authoritative guidance to determine whether or
not Article 4 had been violated.135 First, the Commission determined that
the armed attackers did qualify as combatants, and as a result “despite its
brief duration, the violent clash between the attackers and members of the
Argentine armed forces triggered application of the provisions of Com-
mon Article 3, as well as other rules relevant to the conduct of internal
hostilities.”136 Once it had been determined that IHL had been triggered,
and that the attackers qualified as combatants, the framework of HRL
became insufficient to adequately understand State obligations. Because
IHL allows derogation of the right to life in the course of armed conflict,
the killing of the victims (classified as combatants, rather than as civilians)
was permissible. In a critical passage, the Commission determined that Ar-
gentina had not violated IHL, nor had Argentina violated the right to life
under Article 4 of the ACHR:
Based on its application of said norms of humanitarian law, the
Commission found that there was not sufficient evidence to deter-
mine that the State used illegal methods and means of combat to
retake the barracks at La Tablada in January 1989.  It also deter-
mined that the civilians who took up arms and attacked those bar-
racks became legitimate military targets for such time as they
131. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 39 (1999).
132. See Judith Gardam, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 349, 353 (2001).
133. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 29(d) (“No provi-
sion of this Convention shall be interpreted as . . . excluding or limiting the effect that the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the
same nature may have.”).
134. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 161, 332.
135. Id. ¶ 161 (1997); see also Parada Cea v. El Salvador, Case 10.480, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 1/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 65 (1999); Avila´n, Case
11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ¶ 173.
136. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 156.
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actively participated in the conflict.  Therefore, the deaths of and
wounds inflicted on the attackers, while they were active partici-
pants in the conflict, were legitimately related to the combat, and
do not constitute violations of the American Convention or of the
applicable provisions of humanitarian law.137
Throughout the Tablada deliberations, the Commission employed
IHL as an interpretive device, which allowed it to respect Article 29(d),
prohibiting the Commission from offering judgment in violation of other
international law obligations, including IHL. It determined that IHL pro-
vided a higher standard of protection for the victims in than did HRL. This
outcome, however, depends on who those victims are and how they are
defined by the court within the context at hand. In this instance, the en-
emy combatants sought the “higher” level of protection afforded them
under IHL. Unexpectedly, perhaps, to petitioners in the Abella case, IHL
did not benefit the claimants because once IHL was triggered, it allowed
the Commission to evaluate the government’s acts vis-a`-vis combatants,
not civilians.138 In this situation, the Commission held Argentina’s actions
to a lower standard than they would have had the individuals not been
classified as combatants under HRL. Further, the Commission proposed
that that petitioners may have erred in requesting that the Commission
consider IHL, neglecting to realize that triggering IHL would allow more
derogations of HRL, and not necessarily result in greater protection for
these victims who simultaneously qualified as combatants.139 As a result
of the Commission’s incorporation of IHL and subsequent determination
that the petitioners qualified as combatants, in the end it was the govern-
ment that benefitted, rather than the petitioners themselves.
In defending the choice to use IHL, the Commission also relied on
Article 25 of the ACHR, ensuring that each person is provided with a
suitable legal remedy for any rights violation committed against him or
her.140 The Commission reasoned that if a state has committed itself to
respect IHL, and if the government does not proactively enforce IHL,
then it falls to the Commission to ensure that Article 25 is not violated and
137. Id. ¶ 328. Similarly, in Coard, the Commission utilized the lex specialis argument,
where it was asked to adjudicate on the right to liberty during an international armed con-
flict, and again, it interpreted this right (under the ACHR) in the context of armed conflict
with the benefit of definitional guidance from IHL. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 42 (1999).
138. In retrospect, it is difficult to understand why petitioners chose to invoke IHL
considering the outcome, but it is possible that counsel for the victims (the armed attackers
of the military compound) were emboldened by the Commission’s holding in Avila´n that
Colombia had violated IHL, resulting in their petition that the Commission find that Argen-
tina had also violated IHL.
139. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 178 (1997) (“The Commission be-
lieves that petitioners misperceive the practical and legal consequences that ensued with re-
spect to the application of these rules to those MTP members who participated in the
Tablada attack.”).
140. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 25.
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that some legal remedy for IHL violations does indeed exist for victims.
This rationale underpinned the Commission’s holding in Avila´n:
[t]he right to the protection of humanitarian law is recognized in
the Colombian legal regime . . . Therefore, given that Colombian
domestic law provides for the application of humanitarian law, the
Convention itself authorizes the Commission to analyze humani-
tarian law in cases such as this one, where a violation of Article 25
has been alleged.141
The Commission further defended its choice to apply IHL through
employing Article 27 of the ACHR. That article provides that during times
of war, public danger, or other emergencies, states may be permitted to
derogate from their obligations under the rest of the Convention, pro-
vided, however, that “such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.”142 Thus, IHL (as one of a state’s ob-
ligations under international law) must remain in force, even if other
human rights obligations may be relaxed in the context of a public emer-
gency.143 If, during a time of conflict, a state is permitted to derogate from
HRL obligations, then the Commission may not evaluate that state’s ac-
tions with regard to HRL. The Commission reasoned that if it were also
prohibited during these situations from evaluating a state’s conduct with
respect to IHL, then there would be no effective legal standard by which
to examine a state’s actions during national security emergencies, thus
leaving states with completely free reign during conflict.
Finally, the Commission cited an Advisory Opinion of the Court as a
rationale for its decision to consider IHL. That opinion held that the Com-
mission may utilize treaties that do not emerge from the Inter-American
System.144 The Advisory Opinion resulted from Peru’s request that the
Court clarify a provision of the ACHR that allows the Court to interpret
“other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American
States.”145 The Court determined that the ambit of that provision, Article
64, included not only treaties within the Inter-American System, but also
those that had been adopted outside the system, and to which other states
were party.146 This Advisory Opinion, further supported the Commis-
sion’s approach of direct application of IHL standards in its interpretation
of legal disputes arising out of armed conflict.
141. Avila´n v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 177–78 (1998).
142. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 27.
143. See Avila´n, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 135.
144. See “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, supra
note 93, ¶ 42.
145. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 64 (“The member
states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Conven-
tion or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American States.”).
146. See Avila´n, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 132.
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B. The Court: A Legalist Interpretation of the Statute
Once the Commission began to directly apply IHL and to find states
in breach of these norms, commentators predicted accurately that, before
long, the Court would opine on this controversial topic.147 The Las
Palmeras case, decided in 2000, was both applauded and criticized exten-
sively once the Court did just that. The case is heralded as the first case in
which the Court articulated clear limitations regarding subject matter ju-
risdiction in matters where IHL may apply.148 Yet, it has also been criti-
qued as the decision that led to the deprivation of binding recourse for
victims of humanitarian crimes. Previously, the aforementioned Advisory
Opinion on Article 64 did not preclude the possibility that the Court might
directly apply IHL, holding that “the Commission has properly invoked in
some of its reports and resolutions ‘other treaties concerning the protec-
tion of human rights in the American States,’ regardless of . . . whether
they have been adopted within the framework or under the auspices of the
Inter-American system.”149 This non-categorical approach may be attrib-
uted to the nature of the Advisory Opinion at the Court, which do not
refer to specific facts in a particular state. Ultimately, though, the Court
arrived at a much more black and white approach regarding the capacity
of the IASHR to opine on IHL violations through a series of cases at the
IACtHR.
In comparison to the Commission’s approach, the Court’s treatment
of IHL in Las Palmeras is decidedly more legalistic. In this case, the Court
took the firm stance that the Inter-American System lacks competence to
find violations of any international law other than of its constitutive instru-
ment, the ACHR.150 The case itself arose through a set of facts in which at
least six victims were killed extra-judicially by members of the National
Police Forces, aided by the Colombian armed forces. Further, numerous
other victims were injured, including children and, strikingly, the Colom-
bian national forces attempted to cover-up the killings.151 In referring the
case to the Court, the Commission specifically requested that violations be
147. See, e.g., Zegveld, supra note 22, at 511 (predicting that “at some point in the
future, the Court may be in the position to give an opinion on the Commission’s decision to
apply international humanitarian law directly”).
148. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67 ¶¶ 28–34 (Feb. 4, 2000). Although it is correct that this was the first case
in which the Court addressed the application of IHL, one commentator, Buis, highlights that
the Court had previously considered the challenges inherent in the application of other trea-
ties, notably the Inter-American Convention on Torture, the Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Buis, supra
note 94, at 284–85.
149. “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note
93, ¶ 43.
150. Las Palmeras Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 32–33
(indicating that the American Convention “has only given the Court competence to deter-
mine whether the acts or the norms of the States are compatible with the Convention itself,
and not with the 1949 Geneva Conventions”).
151. Id. ¶ 2.
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found not only of the right to life, codified in Article 4 of the ACHR, but
also of “Article 3, common to all the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”152 In
requesting the Court find violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Com-
mission relied on the competence of both it and of the Court to determine
that a state had violated the Geneva Conventions.
Neither the Court nor Colombia were pleased with the Commission’s
choice to refer the case. Colombia’s preliminary objections claimed that
both adjudicative bodies lacked the competence to find violations of IHL,
but it declined to challenge the classification of the facts of the case as
rising from an internal armed conflict that gave rise to Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions.153 Colombia did, however, argue that no ju-
risdiction to evaluate the IHL legal issues existed.154 The Court agreed
with Colombia, finding that it only had the competence to evaluate IHL in
reference to its compatibility with the American Convention.155 This inter-
pretation is supported by dicta from subsequent cases addressing internal
armed conflict.156 Thus, the ACHR was read as only allowing the Court
and the Commission to determine whether a state has violated human
rights law, but not international humanitarian law.157
According to some critics, Las Palmeras missed an opportunity to
draw explicit connections between human rights law and IHL.158 On the
other hand, those who claimed that the ACHR was unambiguous regard-
ing how IHL should be regarded by the IASHR relied on Article 29(d) of
the American Convention.159 Later jurisprudence has not only reinforced
152. Id. ¶ 28.
153. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 33 (“Colombia had not objected to the Commission’s observation
that, at the time that the loss of lives set forth in the application occurred, an internal armed
conflict was taking place on its territory.”).
154. See id. ¶ 28 (“[T]he State declared that Articles 33 and 62 of the Convention limit
the Court’s competence to the application of the provisions of the Convention. It also in-
voked Advisory Opinion OC-1 of September 24, 1982 (paragraphs 21 and 22) and stated that
the Court ‘should only make pronouncements on the competencies that have been specifi-
cally attributed to it in the Convention.’”).
155. See id. ¶ 34 (“Although the Inter-American Commission has broad faculties as an
organ for the promotion and protection of human rights, it can clearly be inferred from the
American Convention that the procedure initiated in contentious cases before the Commis-
sion, which culminates in an application before the Court, should refer specifically to rights
protected by that Convention (cf. Articles 33, 44, 48.1 and 48).”).
156. In the Serrano-Cruz Sisters case, for example, the Court recalled the “complemen-
tarity of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.” Serrano-Cruz
Sisters v. El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 118, ¶ 112
(Nov. 23, 2004).
157. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
158. See, e.g., Fanny Martin, Application du droit International Humanitaire par la Cour
Interame´ricaine des Droits de L’homme, 844 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1037, 1049 (2001).
159. See BURGORGUE-LARSEN & U´BEDA DE TORRES, supra note 102, at 69. Article
29(d) of the American Convention on Human Rights states “[n]o provision of this Conven-
tion shall be interpreted as . . . excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.”
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 29(d).
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this holding, but cases have also demonstrated that IHL can aid juridical
bodies to arrive at suitable interpretations of HRL laws in contexts of
armed conflict.160
Following the Court’s rebuke of the Commission’s activist application
of IHL through Las Palmeras, another case brought against Guatemala
revealed a less categorical approach. In Ba´maca Vela´squez, the Court con-
firmed its rejection of the direct application of IHL, yet it simultaneously
recognized the role that IHL played as an interpretive reference for cases
of armed conflict.161 This case arose from the torture and murder of a
guerilla fighter at the hands of the Guatemalan military during the internal
armed conflict there.162 The Commission referred the case to the Court,
seeking that Guatemala be found to have violated both the ACHR and
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court refused to ad-
dress the referral of the Geneva Convention violations, basing its rationale
in its previously discussed lack of competence to adjudicate violations of
IHL. Surprisingly, though, the Court did observe that certain acts violating
the ACHR may violate other types of law, such as IHL.163 The Court
found that “the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions may be
taken into consideration as elements for the interpretation of the Ameri-
can Convention.”164 This holding permits the organs of the Inter-Ameri-
can System to employ IHL as an interpretive tool, though they may not
determine whether a State has definitively violated IHL.165
The Ba´maca Vela´squez case, as well as the 2012 case of Santo Dom-
ingo Massacre v. Colombia, reaffirms the Court’s capacity to use IHL as
lex specialis when adjudicating an alleged breach of human rights that has
occurred in the context of armed conflict.166 In the 2012 case of the Santo
Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, the Court in no uncertain terms reiter-
ated its commitment to using IHL as an interpretive reference, but re-
mained unwilling to directly apply it stating,
Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court reiterates that
although the American Convention has only empowered it to de-
160. See Mapiripa´n Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
134, ¶ 115 (Sept. 15, 2005).
161. Ba´maca Vela´squez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, ¶¶
207–09 (Nov. 25, 2000).
162. See id. ¶¶ 2, 16, 91–92.
163. Id. ¶ 208.
164. Id. ¶ 209 (emphasis added).
165. See Byron, supra note 43, at 862. For a more complete discussion of the importance
of the Ba´maca Vela´squez case, see id. at 861–62.
166. Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Repa-
rations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, ¶ 24 (Nov. 30, 2012). It should be
noted that at the time of this writing, two cases are pending at the IACtHR which concern
the intersections between IHL and HRL, yet there is no indication that the Court will deviate
from its previous holdings in either of these cases: Eduardo Nicola´s Cruz Sa´nchez v. Peru,
Case No. 12.444, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2011) and Hugo Oscar Arguelles v. Argentina, Case
No. 12.167, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2011).
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termine the compatibility of the States’ acts and omissions or laws
with this Convention and not with the provisions of other treaties
or customary norms, when making this analysis, it can, as it has in
other cases . . . interpret the obligation and the rights contained in
the American Convention in light of other treaties. In this case, by
using IHL as a supplementary norm of interpretation to the
treaty-based provisions, the Court is not making a ranking be-
tween normative systems, because the applicability and relevance
of IHL in situations of armed conflict is evident. This only means
that the Court can observe the regulations of IHL, as the specific
law in this area, in order to make a more specific application of
the provisions of the Convention when defining the scope of the
State’s obligations.
Tellingly, in the Santo Domingo case, neither the victims’ representa-
tives nor the Commission had asked the Court to find a violation of IHL.
Yet, in this case, the Court took it upon itself to integrate IHL, citing that
it was
appropriate to interpret the scope of the treaty-based norms and
obligations in a way that complements the norms of international
humanitarian law, based on their specificity in this matter, in par-
ticular the 1949 Geneva Conventions and, in particular, Article 3
common to the four conventions.167
As the Court has developed this line of cases, it has reiterated the
holding that jurisdictional constraints within the ACHR require curtailing
the Commission’s capacity to find states in violation of IHL. Clearly the
Court’s holdings have limited the direct application of IHL, but not the
use of IHL as an interpretive reference. This approach remains relevant
within both the Court and the Commission when interpreting facts arising
from armed conflict.
C. The Commission: A More Tempered Approach?
Subsequent to the Court’s determination that direct application of
IHL was inappropriate, the Commission appears to have modified its ap-
proach to analysis of facts giving rise to both HRL and IHL. The facts of
Oscar Romero v. El Salvador led to accusations of human rights violations
in the context of the complicated Salvadorian civil conflict of the 1980s.168
Rather than finding that the state was culpable for having violated the
Geneva Conventions, the Commission deliberately chose its wording in
the report to reference IHL in a manner that alludes to a violation of
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, without ever stating as such, perhaps
so as not to be construed as contradicting the Court’s holding in previous
167. Id. ¶ 187.
168. Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdamez v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 37/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 72 (1999).
Summer 2016] Ambivalent Enforcement 695
cases.169 Rather, the Commission’s report indicated that the state had vio-
lated “the right set forth in Article 4 of the American Convention, in con-
junction with the principles codified in common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.”170 The Commission has continued to simply note or refer-
ence IHL violations, but has ceded using language that would give rise to
the impression that it is finding violations of IHL, thus appearing to heed
the guidance of the Court.171
Although the Commission has not disregarded the Court’s holdings on
this area of law, it has, however, continued to be more active in its employ-
ment of IHL as lex specialis, utilizing IHL as an interpretive reference,
than has the Court. Thus, one commentator’s assessment that the Com-
mission has “realized the error of its ways” and fully adopted the Court’s
opinion is not entirely accurate.172 This choice to continue to actively refer
to and incorporate IHL, rather than to omit it in its assessment entirely,
has been particularly meaningful in light of the Commission’s role as a
venue for claims lodged against the United States regarding treatment of
detainees in the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center.
In exploring the cases that have been brought against the United
States at the Commission, two important factors stand out and distinguish
these cases from cases against other countries involving IHL. First, previ-
ous cases addressing the intersection of IHL and HRL at the Commission
principally concerned internal armed conflict.173 The United States’ so-
called “war on terror,” however, results in the contemplation of IHL viola-
tions outside the territory of the respondent state.174 This situation has
forced the Commission to contemplate questions of extraterritoriality into
its legal analysis. Under the ACHR, a state must respect human rights
within its boundaries.175 Because the United States exercises control over
Guantanamo Bay, a detention center outside its territory, the Commission
has had to seek alternative means of legal analysis. It has adopted an “ef-
fective control” test, similar to the analysis of whether occupation exists,
to determine whether human rights law merits application in these circum-
169. See Moir, supra note 113, at 210.
170. Romero y. Galdamez, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 72 (emphasis
added).
171. See Extrajudicial Executions and Forced Disappearances v. Peru, Case 10.247 et
al., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 101/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.114 doc. 5 rev. ¶¶ 208–15
(2001); Rı´o Frı´o Massacre v. Colombia, Case 11.654, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
62/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. ¶¶ 54–58 (2000); Prada Gonza´lez and Bolan˜o Castro
v. Colombia, Case 11.710, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 63/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111
doc. 20 rev. ¶¶ 32–35 (2000); Ana, Beatriz and Celia Gonzalez Perez v. Mexico, Case 11.565,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 53/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. ¶¶ 45, 54
(2000).
172. See Moir, supra note 113, at 212.
173. See Buis, supra note 94, at 9.
174. See generally Goldman, supra note 52.
175. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 1(1).
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stance.176 The Commission has determined that individuals falling within a
state’s control, yet who exists outside that state’s territory, are still subject
to the requirements of human rights law under the ACHR. This is the case
despite the fact that these situations are also simultaneously governed by
IHL.177 Thus, the Guantanamo cases raise concerns of extraterritorial vio-
lations of IHL, undoubtedly complicating the analysis of IHL and HRL in
these instances.
These cases brought against the United States at the Commission dif-
fer from cases against other states for a second reason: the Commission is
the only juridical body within the IASHR with the competence to hear
claims lodged against the United States.178 As a member of the OAS, the
United States is obligated by the ADRDM, but refused to ratify the
ACHR. As a result, petitions against the United States may be heard at
the Commission (with regard to violations of the Declaration), but it has
no power to adjudicate alleged violations of the Convention.179 This also
indicates that while the Commission has competence to hear these claims,
the Court, normally serving as a binding opinion above the Commission,
does not.180 As a result, petitions brought against the United States do not
have the option of an additional level of scrutiny at the Court. It is impos-
sible to speculate to what extent these factors may affect deliberation in
United States-related cases at the Commission, though certainly all parties
involved are aware of the Commission’s lack of binding jurisdiction.
Almost as soon as it gained notoriety as a detention center for 9/11
related suspects, Guantanamo Bay became the subject of legal activity at
the Commission. That body received its first communication regarding
176. See Sarah Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010) (“Regional human rights tribunals, the U.N. treaty bod-
ies, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) all have recognized that human rights obliga-
tions travel with a state or its agents place persons or territories under the state’s ‘effective
control.’”).
177. See Goldman, supra note 52, at 106.
178. See Carrie Bettinger-Lopez, The Inter-American Human Rights System: A Primer,
42 Clearinghouse Review, 581, 583–84 (describing that the United States, as party to the
Charter, is legally bound by all the provisions of the Declaration).
179. See American Declaration, supra note 81, arts. XVIII, XXV, XXVI; Charter of the
Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Dec. 13, 1951); Protocol of Buenos Aires, Mar. 12, 1970, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, O.A.S.
Treaty Series, No. 1-A (entered into force Feb. 27, 1970); Protocol of Cartagena, Dec. 5, 1985,
O.A.S. Treaty Series, No. 66, 25 I.L.M. 527 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1988); Protocol of
Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3
(SEPF), 33 I.L.M. 1005 (entered into force Sept. 25, 1997); Protocol of Managua, June 10,
1993, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), 33 I.L.M. 1009 (en-
tered into force Jan. 29, 1996); see also Roach v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Resolution No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶¶ 46–47 (1987); Smith
v. United States, Petition 8-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 56/06, OEA/Ser.L/
VII.127, doc. 4 rev. 1, ¶¶ 32–33 (2006).
180. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 178, at 584 (“Since the United States has not rati-
fied the Convention or its Optional Protocol, the court may not hear cases against the United
States.”).
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Guantanamo in 2002, when advocates working on behalf of detainees in
Guantanamo Bay filed a request for precautionary measures there.181 This
activity at the Commission arose even as United States Supreme Court
cases proved that United States courts are unlikely venues for adjudicating
HRL and IHL obligations.182 Recourse to the Inter-American System be-
came an important alternative forum as U.S. federal courts declined to
offer a satisfactory response to allegations of human rights against detain-
ees in Guantanamo. As advocates became more and more frustrated with
the lack of protections offered by the U.S., they made a formal request
that the Commission issue Precautionary Measures against the United
States.183 The victims referred to in this request were approximately 300
individuals from Afghanistan and elsewhere who had been detained in
Guanta´namo Bay as ‘unlawful combatants.’184 In filing the request, advo-
cates for the detainees sought to protect a number of critical rights for
these individuals, in particular focusing on their right to protections under
the Geneva Conventions. These rights included their right to be treated as
prisoners-of-war, to be free from arbitrary, incommunicado and prolonged
detention, and to not be subject to unlawful interrogations and trials by
military commissions in which they could be sentenced to death.185
The Commission’s response to the request for Precautionary Mea-
sures on behalf of Guanta´namo detainees found that the United States
had violated several articles of the American Declaration on the Rights of
Man, to which the United States is a signatory. Specifically, the United
States had failed to ensure the right to a fair trial, to due process, and to
181. Letter from Juan E. Me´ndez, President of the Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., to Detain-
ees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Request for Precautionary Measures (Mar. 13, 2002) [herein-
after Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Request for Precautionary Measures], http://
.umn.edu///.html.
182. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732, 792 (2008) (holding that detained indi-
viduals in Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional right to file petitions for habeas corpus
proceedings and challenge the legality of their detention and finding that “the constitutional
privilege of habeas corpus” extends to aliens detained as enemy combatants at Guanta-
namo); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deciding not to engage in an
assessment of international law and laws of war or “quibble over the intricate application of
vague treaty provisions and amorphous customary principles”); Guantanamo Review Task
Force, FINAL REPORT, at ii (2010), http://.justice.gov//-final-report.pdf (demonstrating detain-
ees remained in jurisdictional limbo as 48 detainees “determined to be too dangerous for
transfer but not feasible for prosecution,” and 30 Yemeni detainees were kept in “condi-
tional” detention “based on the current security environment in that country”).
183. Richard J. Wilson, Omar Khadr: Domestic and International Litigation Strategies
for a Child in Armed Conflict Held at Guantanamo, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 29, 38
(2012) (indicating that request for precautionary measures “was filed on February 25, 2002,
just after the first detainees began arriving at the base in Cuba”).
184. Letter from the United States to the Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Response of the
United States to Request for Precautionary Measures-Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 1015, 1023 (2002) [hereinafter Response of the United States to Re-
quest for Precautionary Measures–Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba].
185. See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Decision on Request
for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002).
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protection from arbitrary arrest.186 These findings by the Commission in-
corporated an analysis of IHL through interpretive reference; it did not
directly find that the United States had violated IHL, per se, but instead,
evaluated the human rights of the detainees (as protected by the ADRM)
within the context of IHL as lex specialis.187 The Commission’s response
to the request for PMs indicated that the United States was, first, “respon-
sible for relocating an individual to an area of its effective control or occu-
pation, thus implying that IHL may be applied in this instance” and,
second, that context (peacetime vs. wartime) may have a bearing on par-
ticular rights guaranteed under the American Declaration.188
When the United States submitted its response to this request for pre-
cautionary measures, this action received great attention because for the
first time, it provided the world insight into the U.S. legal posture toward
its detainees in Guantanamo Bay. In this reply, the United States posited
that the Commission—an adjudicative body charged with evaluating
human rights—lacked competence to apply IHL, even only in a limited
fashion as lex specialis.189 Further, the United States offered a firm rejec-
tion of its legal obligation to protect human rights of detainees, indicating
that “international human rights law is not applicable to the conduct of
hostilities or the capture and detention of enemy combatants, which are
governed by the more specific laws of armed conflict.”190 In the alterna-
tive, it argued, precautionary measures were unnecessary because the cap-
tured individuals, as “unlawful combatants,” did not qualify for protection
under the Geneva Conventions.191 As a result, the United States argued,
its detention of prisoners at Guantanamo did not violate IHL.
The Commission’s response to the United States indicated that inter-
national law “dictates that it may be necessary to deduce the applicable
human rights standard by reference to international humanitarian law as
the applicable lex specialis,” and reiterated that “in all circumstances, the
minimum regime of non-derogable human rights remain applicable and
186. Id. at 533.
187. Id. In his response to petitioners, Commission President Juan Mendez’s response
indicated that, “[i]n certain circumstances, however, the test for evaluating the observance of
a particular right, such as the right to liberty, in a situation of armed conflict may be distinct
from that applicable in time of peace. In such situations, international law, including the
jurisprudence of this Commission, dictates that it may be necessary to deduce the applicable
standard by reference to international humanitarian law as the applicable lex specialis.” Id.
(citation omitted). See also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 161 (1997); Coard v. United States, Case
10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 42
(1999).
188. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures, 41 I.L.M. at 533.
189. See Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures–De-
tainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supra note 184, at 1020–22.
190. Id. at 1020.
191. See id. at 1018.
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subject to supervision by the Commission.”192 The Commission further
emphasized this approach in 2003, when it released a special Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights.193 In that report, the Commission empha-
sized its competence to apply IHL as lex specialis in instances in which
there was a potential breach of Article 27 or Article 29.194 Rick Wilson
describes the Commission’s framework as emphasizing the durability of
human rights at all times, including times of armed conflict.195 Indeed, the
Commission’s decision of March 12, 2002 predated the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush196 in so far as it emphasized that the
United States’ effective control of Guantanamo Bay deemed it responsible
for the protection of the human rights of those detained there, and trig-
gered the evaluation of the relevant HRL with the guidance of IHL.
The ongoing debate regarding Guantanamo Bay at the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission emphasizes the continued relevance of IHL as the judi-
cial organ continues to grapple with the approaches of analysis adopted in
its initial 1997 analysis of the law. Though the Commission has not deter-
mined that it is itself capable of finding violations of IHL in respondent
states, it has, however, continued to use IHL as an interpretive device to
assist in evaluating violations of HRL.197 Within a set of facts such as
those raised at Guantanamo, IHL provides useful interpretive guidance
for how fair trial protections should optimally function under ACHR Arti-
cle 8.198 It also provides important guidance with regard to the ACHR
Article 7 prohibition against arbitrary arrest or detention. As the Commis-
sion considered these protections, it acknowledged that a definition of “ar-
bitrary” that was informed by IHL, rather than one derived directly from
HRL, would lead to differing results.199 IHL authorizes the detention of
192. Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Request for Precautionary Measures, supra
note 184 (emphasis added). Note that one of the non-derogable rights in the Inter-American
system is the judicial remedy of habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Ar-
ticles 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, ¶ 44 (Jan. 30, 1987).
193. See Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 6, ¶¶ 29, 79.
194. See id. ¶¶ 62, 78.
195. Wilson, supra note 183, at 38–39.
196. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 n.15 (2004).
197. Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Request for Precautionary Measures, supra
note 181.
198. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 75(4) (“No sentence may be
passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to
the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly
constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure
. . .”).
199. PM 259/02–Persons detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay, http://www
.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/decisions/GuantanamoMC.asp#23jul (last visited Aug. 15, 2016)
The Commission’s decision was based upon, inter alia, its finding that doubts ex-
isted as to the legal status of the detainees, including the question of whether and
to what extent the Third Geneva Convention or other provisions of international
humanitarian law applied to some or all of the detainees and what implications this
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combatants during international armed conflicts; therefore, there would be
no need to derogate from Article 7 of the ACHR in order to detain an
enemy combatant.200 As Professor Robert Goldman explains, “[t]he Com-
mission has said that during international hostilities consideration must be
given to IHL rules as the applicable lex specialis” and therefore “[s]ince
IHL permits the detention of enemy combatants in such hostilities, the
Commission would find that such detentions do not constitute ‘arbitrary’
depravations of liberty.”201 In evaluating the right of POWs to access trial,
however, IHL offers fewer protections than does HRL. As a result, the
Commission cannot protect the right of POWs “to be informed of the rea-
sons for their detention, to challenge the legality of their detention, or, in
the absence of disciplinary or criminal proceedings, to be provided with
access to legal counsel.”202
Because the protection of the right to trial for POWs receives less pro-
tection under IHL than under HRL, application of IHL standards to HRL
in this context results in a limitation of the habeus corpus protections
under the ACHR. This is a stark distinction between IHL and HRL, as
Article 7 of the ACHR may be derogable, the possibility of derogation
does not extend to protections including habeas corpus or amparo, irre-
spective of the existence of a national emergency.203
The Commission, however, did temper its position that IHL exclu-
sively governs the treatment of POWs. It did so by indicating that in situa-
tions of uncertain duration, protections of IHL may not suffice. In those
contexts, IHL might prove inadequate to safeguard the personal liberty of
detainees and extra precautions provided under HRL must be considered:
Notwithstanding the existence of these specific rules and mecha-
nisms governing the detention of persons in situations of armed
conflict, there may be circumstances in which the supervising
mechanisms under international humanitarian law are not prop-
erly engaged or available, or where the detention or internment of
civilians or combatants continue [sic] for a prolonged period of
time. Where this occurs, the minimum safeguards of IHL may
prove inadequate to properly safeguard the minimum standards of
detainee treatment.204
may have for their international human rights protections, and that absent clarifi-
cation of the legal status of the detainees, the Commission considered that the
rights and protections to which they may be entitled under international or domes-
tic law could not be said to be the subject of effective legal protection by the State.
200. Goldman, supra note 52, at 118.
201. Id.
202. Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 6, ¶ 142.
203. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Articles 27(2), 25 and 8 of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 9, ¶¶ 31–33 (Oct. 6, 1987).
204. Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 6, Executive Summary, ¶ 14.
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Thus, the Commission refuses a strict analysis based on a rule that the
existence of armed conflict results in the unambiguous application of IHL
norms. Rather, the Commission seeks to balance IHL and HRL, and rec-
ognizes that elements of uncertainty may exist, such as the length of deten-
tion, which may become a key factor in determining when and if the
protections under IHL are insufficient. Consider, for example, the issu-
ance of precautionary measures with regard to detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. Weighing a number of mitigating factors in that instance, such as the
length and conditions of detention, the Commission determined that it was
so concerned with the conditions that it relied on the stronger protections
of HRL rather than those offered under IHL.205
As demonstrated by jurisprudence of the Inter-American System, the
regional bodies in the Americas initially attempted a more extreme ap-
proach toward enforcement of IHL through finding states to be in direct
violation thereof. Ultimately, since the competence of the American Con-
vention does not explicitly grant the bodies of the system to find this viola-
tion, the Court has determined that the only way in which IHL should be
incorporated in its jurisprudence is through an interpretive approach. The
specific steps taken within this approach are described in the next section,
and they are evaluated in light of the internationally recognized standard
of lex specialis.
IV. EVALUATING ENFORCEMENT
A. Deconstructing the Interpretive Reference Approach
The previous section offers an overview of the varied approaches that
the Commission and Court have adopted when adjudicating cases that
arise from armed conflict. This analysis demonstrates a number of charac-
teristics of the Court and the Commission’s treatment of the intersections
between HRL and IHL. First, the Inter-American System has explored
two general approaches over the years when confronted with the intersec-
tion. The more controversial approach, the direct application of IHL, was
initially favored and ardently defended by the Commission in early cases.
Yet, eventually, the Court determined that for a number of reasons rooted
in the competence rationae materiae of the judicial organs of the regional
system, it fell outside of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American System to
directly find violations of IHL had been committed by states. Thus, the
Court determined that the Inter-American System should offer no official
pronouncement on whether IHL had been violated by States. The less
controversial approach, which raises fewer concerns regarding the jurisdic-
tion of the System, is the interpretive reference approach to employment
205. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Decision on Request for Precau-
tionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532, 533 (2002) (stating
that “the Commission considers that precautionary measures are both appropriate and neces-
sary in the present circumstances, in order to ensure that the legal status of each of the
detainees is clarified and that they are afforded the legal protections commensurate with the
status that they are found to possess. . .”).
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of IHL. Thus, the System’s choice to rely primarily on the interpretive
reference approach, rather than direct application of IHL, is an a priori
concern of personal jurisdiction rather than substantive analysis.
Once the Court, in the Las Palmeras decision, essentially resolved the
jurisdiction question and clarified that direct application of IHL was
outside its competence, judicial organs of the Inter-American System were
left to apply the interpretive reference approach to the intersections be-
tween IHL and HRL. In order to examine the technique more closely, this
section deconstructs the interpretive reference resolution upon which the
Court and Commission have arrived. This approach offers a resolution to
an emblematic challenge of horizontal fragmentation of laws. When a tri-
bunal faces multiple regimes of international law that may apply simulta-
neously to a particular set of facts, the correct approach, as offered by the
ICJ, is to utilize lex specialis. Recent scholarship, and the jurisprudence in
the Inter-American System, however, has demonstrated that the tool of
lex specialis does not represent a singular, cogent approach.206
Typically defined as allowing a specialized body of law to replace the
more general body of law, lex specialis, when considered with regard to the
intersection of IHL and HRL, might lead to a general conclusion that
since IHL is specialized (applying in times of conflict), and HRL is general
(applying always), that IHL would take priority over HRL. Yet the ap-
proach is much more complicated in practicality and the supposed interna-
tional consensus of this technique leaves many questions unanswered.
Does lex specialis refer to the prioritization of an entire regime of law,
such as IHL, or simply to the particular prioritization with regard to spe-
cific norms? Is lex specialis an approach that seeks to avoid a conflict be-
tween norms in IHL and HRL, or does it seek to resolve the conflict
between them? In several recent articles, Marco Milanovic’s scholarship
clarifies the origins of the concept, and delineates at least three distinct
methods of applying the lex specialis concept.207
First, the “total displacement” version of lex specialis relies on the no-
tion of norm conflict avoidance. This approach is one in which IHL en-
tirely displaces HRL, thereby avoiding any potential normative conflict
that simultaneous application of the two might entail. Yet the total dis-
placement approach to lex specialis flies in the face of multiple human
rights bodies, courts, and scholars.208 In assuming that any conflict be-
tween the two must be avoided, and thus displacing human rights, this
206. Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The
Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27, 46 (2005); Nancy Prud’homme, Lex
Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISR. L. REV.
355, 367-68 (2007); Droege, supra note 13, at 523–24. See generally Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law, supra note 23, ¶¶ 56-122.
207. See generally Milanovic, Norm Conflict, supra note 14; Marko Milanovic, The Lost
Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship Between Human Rights and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Jens David Ohlin ed., forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957 [hereinafter
Lost Origins].
208. Milanovic, Lost Origins, supra note 207.
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approach rejects a general consensus in international law. Further, the to-
tal displacement approach is about conflict between regimes of law, rather
than specific norms within each set of law. Thus, this approach is over-
broad, since it is specific norms within the regimes (such as the interpreta-
tion of right to life, or detention) that may differ and need to be resolved.
A second version of lex specialis is the partial displacement approach,
which is a version of a “strong” lex specialis approach. This approach seeks
to resolve conflicts between norms.209 Last is a version that relies on norm
conflict avoidance or a weak lex specialis that only allows the specialized
body of law into the conversation as an interpretive means. Thus, it has
been interpreted and applied in a variety of methods.210
In evaluating the choices of the Inter-American System, the Commis-
sion’s choice to find that States had indeed committed violations of IHL
represents a conflict resolution approach in that it created a hierarchy be-
tween IHL and HRL. Meanwhile, the interpretive reference approach
takes the middle ground to lex specialis, allowing IHL to be inserted when
application of HRL leaves a critical omission or is missing appropriate
conflict-related definitions. This approach requires the tribunal to engage
in a four-step analysis, as I describe below.
The first step in the application of the interpretive reference approach
to enforcement of IHL at a human rights tribunal is a general identifica-
tion of the potential intersection of conflicting applicable laws. In the cases
at the Inter-American System that address both IHL and HRL, the tribu-
nal must recognize that the facts of a case arise from a situation of armed
conflict, occupation or extended control, as is required for triggering and
applying IHL. It is important to note that the tribunal distinguishes be-
tween armed conflict and simple “disturbances and internal tensions.”211
The Commission has made this distinction a number of times, clarifying
that “riots, sporadic acts of violence and non-organized rebellions” of
short duration and not severe, are excluded in principle from the protec-
tion of the law of war, as in conformity with Article 1.2 of Geneva Con-
vention Additional Protocol II.212
Typically, human rights bodies deem it appropriate to continue to ap-
ply HRL whenever a state is able to address internal unrest through tradi-
tional law enforcement tools. When internal disturbances spark genuine
armed conflict, on the other hand, IHL applies.213 For example, in Abella,
209. Milanovic, Norm Conflict, supra note 14.
210. Droege, supra note 13, at 523-24; Lindroos, supra note 206, at 46; Prud’homme,
supra note 206, at 368.
211. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 148 (1997).
212. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya U´beda de Torres, “War” in the Jurispru-
dence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 148, 160 (2011) (stating
the Commission finds that “riots, sporadic acts of violence and non-organized rebellions’—if
they are short-lived and not characterized as serious—are in principle excluded from the
protection of the laws of war in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions”).
213. See Byron, supra note 43, at 865.
704 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:661
the Commission first addressed the question of whether the incident in-
volved a mere “internal disturbance or tensions,” or instead constituted a
“non-international or internal armed conflict.”214 The answer would de-
termine whether the Commission would apply IHL or human rights princi-
ples on the use of force. Concluding that the Abella incident could not “be
properly characterized as a situation of internal disturbances,”215 the
Commission held that IHL would supply the relevant proportionality stan-
dard to judge whether the rights of the individuals killed were violated.216
Once it has determined that IHL may apply, a second step for a
human rights tribunal is the identification of the specific violations of law
that may be altered, affected, or re-defined by the second area of law.
Notably, the Inter-American System’s approach of interpretive reference
has avoided the overbroad “regime-conflict” approach feared by Mila-
novic, and the consideration instead hones in on specific norms that may
generate conflict between IHR and HRL. The Commission examines
whether the facts arising from armed conflict are evaluated differently
under norms of IHL and HRL. One particularly helpful way to explore
the difference between IHL and HRL is through examination of the dero-
gable instances and consideration of the differences between them, which
can lead to important new definitions. For example, in Abella, the determi-
nation of whether the right to life had been violated turned on whether the
IHL definition of combatants applied.217 In the Guantanamo cases, a cru-
cial norm distinction was whether indefinite detention was permissible,
and whether those detained qualified as POWs.218 Indeed, the texts of
human rights treaties clarify that “States are supposed to use derogations
to avoid conflicts with IHL,”219 and therefore, intersections between IHL
and HRL are likely when these derogations come into play.
Third, a tribunal must do a contextual evaluation of the issue at hand,
utilizing the appropriate IHL norm to assist in determining whether
human rights violations have occurred. As evidenced by the Abella deci-
sion, the distinction that IHL provides between combatant and civilian
protection of the right to life proved crucial, resulting in the Commission
being unable to find that the state had committed a violation of the
ACHR. This contextual evaluation is the key moment in the application of
the lex specialis approach, though as described above, not all lex specialis
approaches are one and the same. The Inter-American System has arrived
at an approach that can most fittingly be described as a partial displace-
ment or a norm-specific displacement position. With this version of a
“strong” lex specialis, the Inter-American System has clarified that it will
214. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 148.
215. See id. ¶ 154.
216. Id. ¶ 161.
217. Id. ¶¶ 178–79 (discussing the definition of a combatant).
218. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Decision on Request for Precau-
tionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532, 533 (2002).
219. Milanovic, Norm Conflict, supra note 14, at 24.
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seek guidance from IHL when applicable, while certainly maintaining its
competence to apply HRL conterminously. Importantly, this evaluation is
distinct from the jurisdictional rationale discussed by the Court and the
Commission, which is an a priori concern of personal jurisdiction rather
than substantive analysis.
Fourth, the decision that the tribunal makes must be rooted in IHL,
and thus achieve a balance between the two arms of law and remain cogni-
zant of the relationship between the two and the need to apply them si-
multaneously. This can be termed a jurisdiction-specific finding. For
example, the jurisdiction of the IACtHR only allows that Court to hold a
state responsible for a violation of human rights.220 As a result, the
Court’s finding under the interpretive reference resolution will never be a
direct, explicit condemnation of a state’s violation of IHL. Despite this,
the Commission’s findings of State violations of human rights may rely
upon definitions with IHL, and as evidenced by the Commission’s first
case after Las Palmeras, may even obliquely notes that an IHL violation
has occurred, though under this approach, it will take great pains to refrain
from finding a direct violation thereof.221 When the IACtHR rejected the
Commission’s attempt to directly apply IHL, thus, it not only challenged
the jurisdictional questions, but also shifted the version of IHL that was
applied. The Commission had attempted a version of IHL application that
was a norm of conflict resolution, meaning that it prioritized IHL because
it found the State directly in violation of it.222
Thus, the interpretive reference approach is a lex specialis approach—
but it is crucial that we are clear about which lex specialis approach we
reference. As a result of the Inter-American System’s choice to interpret,
rather than to directly apply IHL, no juridical body exists to determine
that States in the Americas have committed violations of IHL. There is no
“hard” law enforcement option for IHL. As I elaborate in the following
section, however, the lack of a hard law or binding decision finding IHL
violations does allow space for other forms of enforcement or compliance
with IHL.
B. Evaluation of the Interpretive Reference Method
as Enforcement of IHL
What is the enforcement impact of the interpretive reference ap-
proach to IHL adopted by the Commission? Currently, the interpretive
reference status quo permits analysis utilizing an IHL framework, but does
not allow the Commission to find direct violations of IHL.
One obvious result of this approach is that no juridical body exists to
determine that States in the Americas have committed violations of IHL,
resulting in a lack of hard techniques for the enforcement of IHL. I pro-
220. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, art. 62(3).
221. Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdamez v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 37/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶¶ 66-69 (1999).
222. See Milanovic, Norm Conflict, supra note 14, at 24.
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pose that the use of IHL as an interpretive reference, despite its lack of a
hard technique for enforcement, has a number of advantages, and consti-
tutes an effective soft law means of enforcing of IHL.223 In concert with
other scholars who have asked whether and why international law matters,
I propose that hard law outcomes are not the only measure of success
when evaluating enforcement of IHL.224 Professors Jinks and Goodman
have examined the efficacy of various hard and soft law techniques with
regard specifically to the application of human rights.225 They argue that
on some occasions “‘soft law’ mechanisms will be more effective in estab-
lishing durable norms” than will hard law techniques.226 I conclude that,
similarly, soft methods adopted by the Inter-American System may indeed
be more effective at promoting the values of IHL than would hard law
techniques, which might produce binding judgments against nations.
The argument in favor of the hard law approach is attractive: judg-
ments of the Inter-American Court (though not the Commission) are
binding upon State parties. As has been discussed elsewhere, significant
symbolic power can be attributed to a tribunal emitting a decision, and in
particular, the words used to emit that decision can bear linguistic meaning
that may be larger than the practical effect of the judgment, augmenting
the impact of a tribunal’s holding.227 But scholars have emphasized a num-
ber of concerns, resulting in the conclusion that human rights tribunals
should not employ IHL. Those concerns include (1) that human rights ad-
judicators are not necessarily experts in IHL; (2) that IHL is a system of
law that relies on balanced application between parties who are equals
(which is not how human rights bodies function); and finally, (3) that the
utilization of IHL by human rights tribunals with limited jurisdiction con-
stitutes a violation of the VCLT since states may not have consented to
direct application of these laws, regardless of whether they are still party
to those treaties. I discuss each of these concerns in turn, examining
whether the concern applies only to the direct application of IHL, or
223. In the realm of international law, hard law refers to those mechanisms which are
legally binding, such as treaties, conventions and customary law, as opposed to soft law com-
mitments which are not binding. See generally W. Michael Reisman, A Hard Look at Soft
Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 373 (1988).
224. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2603 (1996–1997); see generally C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Develop-
ment and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989).
225. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 689 (2004).
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., David Luban, Calling Genocide by its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word,
Darfur, and the UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 309–10 (2006) (describing how the word
“genocide” has been transformed into a linguistic device with the power to rouse countries
and multi-national organizations to take humanitarian intervention in the face of the most
tragic human rights abuses, or to make headlines if they refuse). I do not claim that violations
of IHL take on the same symbolic import as the crime of genocide; rather, I claim that the
emission of a decision, a conveyance of guilt from a tribunal, does bear a symbolic
importance.
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whether the concern is diffused if IHL is merely applied as an interpretive
reference rather than directly applied.
(1) Lack of Expertise: In recognition that the Commission and the
Court are experts in HRL, but not necessarily in IHL, critics have ex-
pressed concern that non-experts should not be responsible for determin-
ing violations of IHL. Theodore Meron, articulating a concern that is
unsurprising in an era of fragmentation of international law, has articu-
lated the concern that a lack of expertise may result in “conclusions that
humanitarian law experts find problematic.”228 Furthering concern re-
garding the role of expertise, Rene Provost has opined that human rights
adjudicators may unwittingly preference their interpretation of IHL in the
direction of HRL, due simply to their great familiarity and practice in
human rights law.229 One potential way to ameliorate concerns regarding
lack of expertise in IHL is for adjudicative human rights bodies to offer
trainings in IHL, as the IASHR has done.230 Another potential problem
arising from the integration of IHL and HRL is that the intersections be-
tween the two may give rise to a grey zone of uncertainty of interpretation,
when IHL has traditionally relied on bright lines and clear categories in
order to provide guidance and instruction to military personnel who may
need to apply these rules in real-life situations in conflict zones.231 The
concern here is that the high standards laid out within a human rights
framework may set unrealistically high standards that are not feasible in
practical application when speedy decision-making is required.
If adjudicators who typically deal with human rights concerns are en-
gaged in analysis of IHL, a lack of expertise in this complex field may have
the potential to cause problems. Determination of whether or not IHL is
triggered by a particular context, and whether that context should qualify
as an armed conflict or occupation exists are legal determinations that can-
not always be resolved through simple tests. Specialized expertise in IHL
may be helpful in making these determinations.232 Were the Commission
228. Meron, supra note 32, at 247.
229. See RENE´ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
161 (Cambridge U. Press eds., 2005).
230. See IACtHR Annual Report (2002), OEA/Ser.L/ V/III.57, doc. 5 (111) 45 (2003)
(referring to the “Second Study and Exchange Workshop on International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) and Related Issues”).
231. See Eden & Happold, supra note 25, at 445.
232. Broad scholarship exists here discussing the establishment of armed conflict or
occupation. See generally John A. Cohan, Legal War: When Does it Exist, and When Does it
End?, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 223–24 (2004) (assessing the existence of a
war in the legal sense and whether wartime legislation and obligations are triggered);
Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 69–77 (2005) (distinguishing rebellion and
insurgency from belligerency and internal armed conflict which is capable of invoking rights
and obligations under IHL); Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 236, 241 (1998) (criticizing the characteri-
zation of armed conflict following the ICJ decision in Nicaragua and arguing that “[t]he real-
ity, dimensions, scope and duration of a foreign military intervention, the foreign state’s
direct participation in the hostilities, . . . the relative involvement of local and foreign forces,
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or Court to insufficiently evaluate whether armed conflict or occupation
exists, that could diminish their capacity to evaluate subsequent HRL
violations.
Perhaps the most compelling logic offered by the Commission for
utilizing IHL as interpretive reference is that finders-of-fact benefit from
the guidance of IHL when contemplating situations of armed conflict.  Yet
if the Commission could not refer to IHL in preparing country reports, it
would be placed in the extremely difficult situation of being asked to ana-
lyze the conduct of armed dissident groups without reference to any previ-
ously-established standards. One area where the Commission needs to
refer to IHL is in distinguishing whether an individual should be consid-
ered a non-combatant or a legitimate military target.233 In evaluating this
question, the Commission indicated that, “the provisions of conventional
and customary humanitarian law generally afford victims of armed con-
flicts greater or more specific protections than do the more generally
phrased guarantees in the American Convention and other human rights
instruments.”234 This generalization that victims of armed conflict will gain
additional protections if IHL is employed demonstrates that the clarifica-
tion offered by IHL can be instrumental in providing victims recourse.
(2) Imbalance Between Parties: The concept of reciprocity within IHL
has long been held to be a central aspect of IHL. In other words, IHL can
only be applied between equal parties with equal rights and obligations.
This principle leads to a significant concern if IHL is applied by HRL
tribunals who only have jurisdiction to hear claims against states: the eval-
uation of accountability is necessarily imbalanced, since its mandate essen-
tially compels it to ignore potential IHL violations of non-state actors.
The Abella decision demonstrates how concerning an imbalance be-
tween parties can be, when a human rights tribunal finds itself competent
to find that a State has committed a violation of IHL.235 The facts demon-
strated that both the attackers of the Tablada military base and the Argen-
tine military had committed violations of IHL. Yet, because the
Commission’s ratione persone only permits evaluation of acts committed
by State actors, but not those of non-State actors, it was forced to limit its
application of IHL to Argentina’s conduct alone. The Commission’s lack
of capacity to consider the actions of the armed opposition group led to a
decision that was necessarily imbalanced. Although the Commission at-
tempted to rectify this imbalance by observing that both parties had obli-
gations under IHL, the nature of proceedings at a human rights body
prevented the Commission from explicitly analyzing the actions of the
and . . . factual and military considerations” should determine the existence of armed
conflict).
233. See Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 161 (1997).
234. Id. ¶ 159.
235. Zegveld, supra note 22, ¶ 21 (“Application to only one party to the conflict, the
State, may be considered as contradicting a basic principle of humanitarian law, according to
which both parties to the conflict have equal rights and duties.”).
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non-state actor. It has also aimed to ameliorate this situation through its
power to examine the general situation of human rights in a country,236
and through reports and missions, has recognized the role that non-state
actors play within conflict.237 Despite these attempts to integrate the bal-
ance requirements of IHL into the analysis at a human rights body such as
the Commission, it is clear that jurisdictional constraints within the
IASHR do not allow a completely balanced assessment of IHL violations.
Thus, the Commission’s activist and direct application approach, as
demonstrated in Abella, results in an imbalanced application of IHL. This
highlights one of the principle critiques of tribunal enforcement of IHL:
since IHL is reliant on the premise of conflict between equals,238 a tribu-
nal evaluating the actions of only one of the parties will be doomed to an
imbalanced evaluation. This problem can be avoided to some degree
through the interpretive reference approach. If IHL is not directly applied,
but instead only used as interpretation, the imbalance still may remain, but
is less problematic if there is no official proclamation of a violation having
been committed by either party. Even though the interpretive approach
still requires reference to a violation of IHL, it would not be as problem-
atic since it allows reference to any violations of IHL without
discrimination.
(3) Potential for Violations of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT): Finally, principles of international treaty interpretation,
most centrally embodied by the VCLT, have been cited as evidence that
IHL should not be applied by human rights bodies of the Inter-American
System. The American Convention itself is explicit that no other denuncia-
tions, aside from those delineated in the Convention itself, may lead to
proceedings. Further, the VCLT requires that a State’s acts may only be
evaluated if the state has agreed to be bound by that treaty and has thus
offered its express consent.239 This principle was reiterated by the Court’s
holding in Las Palmeras:
The American Convention is an international treaty according to
which States Parties are obliged to respect the rights and freedoms
embodied in it and to guarantee their exercise to all persons sub-
ject to their jurisdiction. The Convention provides for the exis-
tence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to hear ‘all
236. DIEGO RODRI´GUEZ-PINZO´N & CLAUDIA MARTIN, THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE
AND ILL-TREATMENT IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: A HANDBOOK FOR
VICTIMS AND THEIR ADVOCATES 148 (Boris Wijkstro¨m ed., 2006).
237. See generally Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9 rev. 1 (1999) (explaining that the Commission
must rely on international humanitarian law because the Convention lacks standards of dis-
tinction and proportionality).
238. See Meron, supra note 32, at 240; see also Byron, supra note 43, at 883; Fragmenta-
tion of International Law, supra note 23.
239. Vienna Convention, supra note 95, art. 47.
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cases concerning the interpretation and application’ of its provi-
sions (Article 62.3).240
The requirement that states only be evaluated regarding norms to
which they have offered their express consent is particularly salient consid-
ering the current political climate at the Inter-American System. In recent
years, more and more states have expressed concerns regarding the viabil-
ity and impartiality of the IASHR.241 If the Court and the Commission
wish to continue engaging with states as parties, the states must have con-
fidence that the system is operating in conformity with the requirements of
international law and the VCLT in particular. Yet it is inaccurate to char-
acterize these states as refusing to follow IHL – although these states did
not consent to the IASHR’s evaluation of their compliance with IHL,
these states did consent to comply with IHL norms by signing onto the
Geneva Conventions.242 If states are willing to sign onto a treaty commit-
ting to respect IHL, but are not willing to have their actions analyzed, this
may signal as undermining their commitment to the purpose of the treaty
itself.
Certainly, the VCLT does not mandate that states comply with trea-
ties if they are not party to those treaties. Yet, in interpreting whether a
treaty has been violated, treaty parties may consider “any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”243 This
provision of the Vienna Convention mirrors Article 29 of the ACHR, both
of which support the inclusion of IHL in any context that may be perti-
nent. As explained by Alexsander Orakhelashvili,
[t]he subjects governed by one body of law are frequently also
governed by the other body of law, and whatever the formal and
procedural constraints on the powers of national and international
decision-making bodies, in the exercise of their mandate they are
expected, at least by implication, to consider the impact of both
human rights law and humanitarian law, to reach the outcomes
permissible at the level of international law.244
Further, states are responsible for respecting both IHL and HRL as their
relevant international obligations dictate.245 Although required to respect
IHL, a state’s supervisory instruments do not necessarily have competence
240. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 32 (Feb. 4, 2000).
241. During the October 2012 Sessions of the IACHR, member States gathered to dis-
cuss the crisis in the Inter-American system and potential modifications to strengthen the
System. See Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Convenes Hearings on
Strengthening of the Inter-American System on Human Rights (Oct. 10, 2012), https://.oas.org/
//_center///.asp.
242. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3.
243. Vienna Convention, supra note 95, art. 31(3)(c).
244. Orakhelashvili, supra note 26, at 168.
245. Buis, supra note 94, at 274.
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to adjudicate breaches of IHL without state consent. Despite the limita-
tions of the requirement of “express consent” under the VCLT,246 on oc-
casion (as evidenced by Abella) IHL benefits a state’s position, rather than
the petitioner.
Concerns regarding the violation of the “express consent” aspect of
the VCLT are most relevant in considering the direct application of IHL.
In the case of IHL used as interpretive reference, no state party to the
ACHR is at risk of being held to standards to which it has not expressly
consented. This rationale, however, does not solve concerns regarding dif-
fering interpretations of IHL. For example, during the Guantanamo litiga-
tion at the Commission, the United States declined to define its detainees
there as POWs, instead calling them unlawful enemy combatants and de-
priving them of the protection of the Geneva Conventions. As evidenced
by this example, the interpretive reference solution cannot solve all poten-
tial conflicts of interpretation, but at a minimum, it expressly avoids hold-
ing countries to standards to which they may not be bound.
As highlighted above, none of these three concerns are entirely abated
by human rights tribunals employing the interpretive reference approach
rather than a direct application of IHL. The fact remains, however, that
the stakes are somewhat lower if the tribunal is not seeking to hold a coun-
try in violation of treaty obligations. The soft law approach of interpretive
reference, though it does not offer a binding decision that States have vio-
lated IHL, offers many enforcement advantages. Goodman and Jinks
identify that there tends to be among scholars a shared sense that “compli-
ance is best induced by the exercise of coercive authority–such as military
intervention or binding decisions of third-party monitoring institu-
tions.”247 They claim that an acculturation approach characterized by “soft
law” mechanisms may be most effective in establishing durable norms.
Another advantage of the interpretive reference approach is that it
benefits HRL, as it leads to a more nuanced, developed and sophisticated
application of HRL informed by IHL, as discussed throughout this paper
in the jurisprudence at the Inter-American System. Second, the approach
benefits enforcement of IHL as well. Although the interpretive reference
approach denies the Inter-American System the capacity to mandate bind-
ing decisions or material sanctions for violations of IHL, other soft law
effects are demonstrated by this approach. This lack of jurisdiction to de-
clare states to be in violation of IHL may not be as dire as some perceive.
Despite the lack of hard law enforcement at the Commission, the in-
terpretive reference approach enables the Inter-American System to func-
tion within a delicate political environment. As a treaty regime that is
often subject to criticism from member-states, and more recently, subject
to threats and withdrawals of jurisdiction, the Inter-American System has
246. See supra Part II.B. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits the
enforcement of treaty obligations on States that have not consented to be bound. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 95, pmbl. (“Noting that the principles of free consent and of good
faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized.”).
247. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 225, at 689.
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learned to walk the delicate line in order to maintain legitimacy in the
current political arena.248
Additionally, consideration of the relevance of IHL may be important
simply as a reminder to States of their IHL obligations. It is quite possible
that states’ cognizance of IHL may play a large role in these norms being
respected, as buttressed by Harold Koh’s claim that “[l]ike most laws, in-
ternational rules are rarely enforced, but usually obeyed.”249 Due to the
limited options for enforcement, if human rights bodies are able to employ
IHL in any manner, this practice has the potential to strengthen States’
compliance with IHL.250 Increased awareness of and references to IHL
may, in turn, prompt States to consider means of domestic accountability
for IHL breaches, which conforms with the initial vision of enforcement
when the Geneva Conventions were first drafted.251
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the complexities that arise when human
rights tribunals, such as the Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights, are confronted with the option to enforce IHL. In many
instances, facts may give rise not only to use of international HRL, but
also of IHL. This Article has traced the two intertwining means by which
IHL has been incorporated into the IASHR’s jurisprudence. First, in sev-
eral specific cases, the Commission chose to find itself capable to apply
IHL to facts arising from armed conflict. In those specific cases, the Com-
mission determined that states involved had, in fact, violated their legal
obligations under the laws of war. Second, on numerous occasions, both
the Court and the Commission have utilized IHL as an interpretive refer-
ence which provides context and aids in interpreting the nuances of HRL
during conflict. This practice, which can be viewed as a vigorous applica-
tion of the lex specialis principle, has been critical for the adjudicators of
the IASHR. It has proved to be integral to those human rights organs in
interpreting complex legal norms which are significantly altered during
armed conflict.
The lex specialis approach is certainly a less controversial one than the
“direct application” approach employed on limited instances by the Com-
mission. It is less controversial largely because it stems directly from ICJ
jurisprudence interpreting the proper relationship between IHL and HRL,
although that Court declined to offer any practical guidance as to how this
interplay should operate in practice. The Court continues to interpret its
jurisdiction rationae materiae as preventing the direct application of IHL,
248. See generally Dulitzky, supra note 12 (describing the recent crisis within the Inter-
American System of Human Rights when States have renounced their membership in the
system and criticized it as overly active in its reproach of States).
249. Koh, supra note 224, at 2603.
250. See Heintze, supra note 47, at 798.
251. See Byron, supra note 43, at 845.
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and therefore, direct application of IHL is not considered to be within the
current scope of either the Court or the Commission.
Despite these restrictions, the IASHR does allow use of IHL as an
interpretive tool, as it does not conflict with the jurisdictional restraints
imposed on human rights tribunals in their constitutive treaties.
This Article does not simply claim that the IASHR should, or should
not, employ IHL. Instead, this Article posits that there is no legal basis for
preventing the usage of IHL as an interpretive reference. This approach
brings greater precision to holdings regarding violations of international
human rights law within the context of armed conflict or occupation.
When this approach is utilized by the IASHR, however, an important
caveat must be noted regarding the importance of expertise, as discussed
extensively above. A lack of expertise in the area of IHL at the Commis-
sion or the Court may lead to greater confusion and fragmentation about
the appropriate use of IHL as an interpretive reference when these organs
adjudicate human rights claims that occur during times of conflict. Con-
cern regarding the lack of expertise should not preclude the employment
of IHL in this manner at human rights bodies; rather, this concern should
serve as a reminder of the need for appropriate training and for great care
when an adjudicative body ventures outside of its zone of comfort.
This Article has also explored the benefits and drawbacks of human
rights bodies finding direct violations of IHL among state parties. Consid-
ering the paucity of tools with which to evaluate states on their compliance
with IHL, it is admirable and understandable that human rights advocates
would encourage the practice of direct application of IHL. In particular, if
the Court for example, is already conducting a de facto evaluation of IHL
in order to utilize it as an interpretive reference, efficiency might argue
that that same body should be permitted to simply determine whether or
not the state has committed a violation of IHL. Yet there are number of
significant jurisdictional concerns that ultimately have led the court to de-
termine that direct application of IHL is inappropriate.
This Article draws the conclusion that human rights tribunals may util-
ize the interpretive reference approach as a soft law technique to promote
enforcement of IHL. This approach, considering the jurisdictional re-
straints within the system, is an apt solution, as evidenced by Ba´maca Ve-
lazquez. There, the Court held that, “the relevant provisions of the
Geneva Conventions may be taken into consideration as elements for the
interpretation of the American Convention.”252 This holding reveals the
critical distinction between permitting mention of IHL as an interpretive
reference, as opposed to having competence to find IHL violations.
Despite the lack of capacity of a human rights body to find direct vio-
lations of IHL, this does not necessarily diminish the power of any refer-
ence to the Geneva Conventions. In the process of using IHL to interpret
human rights law, an adjudicative body must reference the relevant IHL
252. Ba´maca Vela´squez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, ¶
209 (Nov. 25, 2000).
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norms, thus flagging that a conflict situation exists triggering the Geneva
Conventions. This mention alone can serve as an important reminder to
State parties that conflict situations give rise to additional obligations.253
Certainly, any reference to IHL within a judgment on human rights meets
the goal of shining light on IHL obligations, and does so without the in-
creased controversy of directly applying IHL.
In addition to flagging that a conflict situation exists in which the Ge-
neva Conventions apply, reference to IHL by a human rights body can
play a significant role in promoting self-monitoring of IHL by States dur-
ing conflict. Even Colombia, a country who was hostile to the finding of
direct violations of IHL by the Court, did not question that it was obli-
gated to comply with certain requirements under IHL when these were
flagged by the Court in Las Palmeras.
In the seminal Las Palmeras case, the Court rejected the Commis-
sion’s application of IHL due to its evaluation of the limitations of jurisdic-
tion rationae materiae. Since then, both the Commission and the Court
have limited their use of IHL to interpretation, not application, of the law
of war.
Will there come a time when the Inter-American System once again
will become more hospitable to the finding of IHL violations by states?
Despite the Court’s rebuke of this approach, it should not be dismissed as
a fringe or radical approach. The distinguished members of the Commis-
sion at the time saw fit to apply the law in this way, and further, even a
Judge Canc¸ado Trindade, former President of the Court, also approved of
the Commission’s approach in his separate opinion in Las Palmeras.
There, he described the Commission’s approach as a “coextensive interpre-
tation and application of Article 4 of the American Convention on Human
Rights and of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions on Inter-
national Humanitarian Law.”254 Were a majority of adjudicators on the
Commission or the Court to adopt this mindset, it is possible that the use
of IHL within the IASHR could shift once again.
Other circumstances, external to the Inter-American System, could
also persuade the Court to allow direct violations to be found against state
parties. These might include situations in which other regional bodies
agree to adopt this approach, or if the International Law Commission or
the International Court of Justice were to take a bold and unambiguous
position regarding the proper role of IHL within human rights adjudica-
tive bodies. These extreme contexts might allow the Court to reconsider
its interpretation of the proper rationae materiae.
Currently, the Inter-American System’s approach with regard to anal-
ysis of IHL is one that achieves a delicate and critical balance: it is limited
253. See Zegveld, supra note 22, at 509 (making a similar claim, that “[I]t is not obvious
that the aim of protection can only be achieved by applying international humanitarian law.
Would it not have sufficed for the Commission to apply provisions of the American Conven-
tion interpreted in the light of international humanitarian law?”).
254. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 2 (Feb. 4, 2000) (separate opinion of Judge A.A. Canc¸ado Trindade).
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in jurisdiction, yet remains politically viable within a regional system reli-
ant on state support. The adjudicative bodies are limited in their capacity
to emit binding decisions regarding any state violation of IHL norms, since
interpretation of IHL is limited by the Court’s strict reading of its jurisdic-
tion rationae materiae during armed conflict. Still, the balance that has
been achieved with regard to the use of IHL is significant, considering the
controversial nature of direct application of IHL. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, this balance is also effective, considering the significant symbolism
of utilizing IHL as an interpretive reference, reminding states of their obli-
gations under IHL during times of armed conflict.
